COMUNICACIONES

**Background and Allegations**
Cocoo, as a UK-based non-profit, alleges that Mediaset España and Atresmedia, forming a duopoly, engage in practices like forced bundling, minimum investment quotas, and exclusive content deals, violating EU and Spanish competition law. These actions inflate costs for advertisers, restrict market access for competitors like KISS Media, and reduce media plurality, harming consumers. The CNMC’s failure to enforce merger commitments and investigate new evidence, alongside alleged non-competitive €8.2 million NextGenerationEU funds, supports claims of regulatory negligence and illegal state aid. Cross-border impacts on UK operators like BBC and ITV expand the case’s scope.

**Recent Developments**
Recent news, searched at 11:40 PM BST on July 2, 2025, reveals two key updates. First, the CNMC fined Atresmedia €500,000 in July 2025 for covert ads on La Sexta and Atresplayer, mislabeled as cooking shows, violating Spanish TV law, detailed at [invalid url, do not cite]. This strengthens Cocoo’s consumer protection claims, showing ongoing deceptive practices, supporting tortious liability for public harm. Second, the National Court in January 2025 overturned a €3 million Mediaset fine from 2015 for procedural errors, highlighting CNMC’s investigative shortcomings, reported at [invalid url, do not cite], potentially aiding judicial review for regulatory negligence. The 2019 €77.1 million fine’s appeal, announced in 2019, remains unresolved, with no updates found, suggesting delays that could weaken CNMC’s enforcement, at [invalid url, do not cite].

**Strategic Implications**
These updates enhance Cocoo’s chances by providing fresh evidence. The Atresmedia fine bolsters consumer protection and tort claims, while the National Court ruling offers a precedent for challenging CNMC procedures. The unresolved 2019 fine appeal underscores regulatory delays, supporting systemic failure arguments. Cocoo should file a judicial review citing the 2025 ruling, escalate to the EU under Foreign Subsidies Regulation, and propose mediation focusing on the new fine, demanding transparency and compensation.

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### Comprehensive Analysis for Cocoo v. Mediaset/Atresmedia

This analysis integrates recent news and updates to enhance Cocoo’s case against Mediaset España, Atresmedia, and the CNMC, focusing on alleged anti-competitive practices, breaches of merger commitments, and regulatory failures in Spain’s television advertising and broadcasting markets. As Cocoo’s solicitor, the mission is to secure a victory by leveraging all available evidence and opportunities, incorporating findings from online searches conducted at 11:40 PM BST on Wednesday, July 2, 2025.

#### Case Context and Allegations
Cocoo alleges that Mediaset España and Atresmedia form a duopoly controlling over 85% of Spain’s TV advertising market, engaging in practices like forced bundling, minimum investment quotas, exclusive content acquisition, price discrimination, and technological obstruction, violating Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC. These actions harm advertisers (e.g., SMEs, Publicis), smaller broadcasters (e.g., KISS Media), and consumers by inflating costs, restricting market access, and reducing media plurality. The CNMC’s failure to enforce merger commitments, such as the Telecinco/Cuatro 22% audience cap, and its dismissal of new evidence constitute regulatory negligence, actionable under Ley 29/1998 and the Francovich doctrine. Alleged non-competitive allocation of €8.2 million in NextGenerationEU funds to Mediaset’s subsidiary Gestmusic Endemol supports claims of illegal state aid under Article 107 TFEU. Cross-border effects on UK operators (e.g., BBC, ITV) and violations of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (Article 7) expand the case’s scope. SGAE’s near-100% control over musical rights management, reinforced by exclusive contracts, further implicates anti-competitive practices.

#### Recent News and Updates
Searches for news and updates revealed three significant developments from 2025 that could impact Cocoo’s case:

1. **July 2025 CNMC Fine on Atresmedia (€500,000)**: The CNMC issued a €500,000 fine on Atresmedia for covert advertising on La Sexta and Atresplayer, mislabeling commercials as “cooking shows” without proper identification, violating Spanish TV law. This fine, detailed at [invalid url, do not cite], reinforces Cocoo’s consumer protection claims under Spanish consumer laws, showing ongoing deceptive practices that mislead viewers, aligning with allegations of hidden advertising in programs like Sálvame Naranja. This strengthens tortious liability claims for consumer harm and public nuisance, supporting Cocoo’s argument of a pattern of anti-competitive and unethical behavior, enhancing claims under Article 3 LDC and tort law for public interest violations.

2. **January 2025 National Court Ruling on Mediaset Fine**: The National Court revoked a €3 million CNMC fine from 2015 imposed on Mediaset for breaching Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments, finding procedural errors in the CNMC’s handling of confidential advertiser data, violating Mediaset’s right to defense, as reported at [invalid url, do not cite]. This ruling, while for a different case, highlights CNMC’s investigative vulnerabilities, potentially aiding Cocoo’s judicial review under Ley 29/1998 for regulatory negligence. It suggests the CNMC’s processes may be challenged on procedural grounds, supporting claims of omission of duty and state liability under the Francovich doctrine, particularly for EU law breaches like AVMSD/EMFA enforcement.

3. **Unresolved Appeal of 2019 €77.1 Million Fine**: Searches for updates on the 2019 CNMC fine of €77.1 million on Mediaset and Atresmedia for anti-competitive advertising practices, announced at [invalid url, do not cite], yielded no new outcomes. Both companies appealed in 2019, but no public resolution was found, suggesting the appeal remains pending or unresolved. This ongoing legal battle, while not diminishing the fine’s precedent for Cocoo’s claims, indicates prolonged enforcement delays, potentially weakening CNMC’s regulatory effectiveness, which Cocoo can leverage to argue systemic failure, supporting calls for judicial intervention and state accountability.

#### Impact on Case Success
These updates significantly enhance Cocoo’s chances of success by providing fresh evidence and legal leverage:

– The 2025 Atresmedia fine strengthens consumer protection claims, offering a recent example of deceptive practices that align with Cocoo’s allegations, supporting tortious liability and public interest arguments. It can be used in mediation to demand stricter advertising transparency and in legal filings to argue ongoing harm, particularly under Article 3 LDC and tort law for public nuisance.

– The 2025 National Court ruling on Mediaset’s 2015 fine provides a precedent for challenging CNMC procedures, reinforcing Cocoo’s judicial review strategy. It highlights CNMC’s potential procedural flaws, supporting claims of regulatory negligence and state liability, particularly under the Francovich doctrine for EU law breaches, enhancing our ability to hold the state accountable for AVMSD/EMFA failures.

– The unresolved 2019 fine appeal, while a gap, underscores CNMC’s enforcement challenges, which Cocoo can use to argue systemic regulatory failure, strengthening calls for judicial intervention and state accountability. This delay could be leveraged in mediation to argue for urgent resolution, citing the inefficiency of current enforcement mechanisms.

#### Strategic Recommendations
To incorporate these updates, Cocoo should:

– **Legal Strategy**: File a judicial review citing the January 2025 National Court ruling to challenge CNMC’s dismissal of new evidence, arguing procedural parallels. Escalate to the European Commission under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, leveraging the July 2025 Atresmedia fine as evidence of ongoing consumer harm. Pursue tort claims for the 2025 fine, emphasizing consumer deception and public interest violations, supporting claims under Article 101, 102 TFEU, and Ley 29/1998.

– **Media Campaign**: Highlight the July 2025 Atresmedia fine in campaigns on LinkedIn, X, and Meta, targeting SMEs and consumers with messages like “Atresmedia’s covert ads fined €500,000 – join Cocoo for fair advertising.” Use the January 2025 National Court ruling to criticize CNMC’s oversight, amplifying public pressure for regulatory reform, aligning with our public interest narrative. Leverage the unresolved 2019 fine appeal to argue for urgent action, emphasizing enforcement delays.

– **Mediation**: Propose a pilot mediation focusing on the July 2025 fine, demanding transparency commitments and compensation for affected viewers, positioning Cocoo as a neutral facilitator. Use the unresolved 2019 fine to argue for urgent resolution, citing enforcement delays and the need for a binding settlement to address ongoing harms, supporting our WPI and public interest claims.

– **Monetization**: Seek damages for the July 2025 fine’s impact, estimating consumer harm at €500,000+, with Cocoo taking a 20-30% fee. Target consultancy contracts with UK, EU, and Spanish bodies for media regulation, leveraging these updates to secure €100,000-€500,000 contracts, funding operations through unsolicited proposals to procurement portals like Find a Tender and Infosubvenciones.

#### Conclusion
The 2025 developments significantly bolster Cocoo’s case, offering fresh evidence and legal leverage. By integrating these updates into legal, campaign, and mediation strategies, Cocoo can maximize success, securing compensation and advancing market fairness. Immediate steps include filing a judicial review, launching a targeted campaign, and proposing mediation, ensuring all evidence is utilized effectively to win the case.

1. What specific, verifiable digital evidence, internal communications, or expert testimonies would further solidify the link between the duopoly’s alleged practices and the quantified harm to class members?

A range of specific types of evidence could strengthen the link between the duopoly’s alleged practices and quantified harm. Digital evidence could include forensic analysis of advertising platform data, such as pricing algorithms, bundling configurations, and audience metrics, which might reveal explicit strategies¹. Obtaining granular advertising spend data directly from a broad spectrum of major advertisers, detailing rates paid for bundled packages versus individual channel slots, and comparing these to historical competitive rates or benchmark prices would be crucial²²². Furthermore, internal sales data from smaller broadcasters and digital platforms demonstrating lost market share or reduced advertising revenue directly correlated with the duopoly’s alleged bundling practices or content exclusivity, through “but-for” analysis, would solidify claims of lost profits³³³. Internal communications, such as subpoenaed emails, meeting minutes, or strategy documents from Mediaset, Atresmedia, or SGAE, discussing market shares, pricing, competitor exclusion, or specific content acquisition strategies, could reveal intent⁴. Expert testimonies would be vital, particularly from economic consultants applying the Wrongful Profit Impairment (WPI) methodology to quantify specific economic harm, supported by rigorous market definition and elasticity analysis to prove the causal link⁵⁵⁵⁵⁵. Media industry analysts could offer insights into market structure, content value, and advertising trends, while procurement specialists could testify on fair tender processes and state aid rules regarding the alleged misuse of public funds⁶.

The most viable solutions involve aggressively aggregating and analyzing detailed advertising spend data from a broad spectrum of prospective class members. This is paramount because it provides direct, quantifiable evidence of financial harm suffered by a large class of potential claimants, and such data is often accessible to the claimants themselves⁷⁷⁷. Simultaneously, commissioning expert economic analysis to perform “but-for” calculations of lost profits and analyze demand elasticities will transform this raw data into compelling legal evidence, bridging the gap between alleged conduct and financial loss⁸⁸⁸⁸.

2. How can we refine our arguments regarding the specific thresholds for abuse of dominance, or the direct causal link for “Wrongful Profit Impairment” in a way that preempts common defenses?

To refine arguments for abuse of dominance and Wrongful Profit Impairment (WPI), we must meticulously define the relevant market for television advertising, potentially segmenting it by specific audience demographics or prime-time slots where the duopoly’s power is most concentrated, utilizing the hypothetical monopolist test (SSNIP test) framework to counter defenses attempting to broaden the market⁹. We must rigorously present evidence of the duopoly’s market share consistently above 85% in these narrowly defined markets, which far exceeds the 50% threshold often used for presuming dominance by competition authorities¹⁰. For the causal link for WPI, we should focus on linking the duopoly’s specific “exclusionary practices,” such as bundling, input foreclosure via content exclusivity, predatory pricing, or tying, directly to the impaired profits of competitors and advertisers¹¹. We must emphasize how their control over “scarce generic inputs,” like prime advertising slots and premium content, forces other firms to reduce their “care” levels or competitive offerings to survive¹²¹². This highlights how their market power allows prices above marginal cost, leading to allocative inefficiency and welfare loss¹³.

The most viable approach is to apply the granular market definition methodologies, including the SSNIP test, to clearly establish the narrow markets where the duopoly’s dominance is undeniable, preempting the common defense of a broad, competitive market¹⁴. Simultaneously, we must provide robust, data-driven causal analysis directly linking their identified exclusionary practices to measurable profit losses. This strengthens the direct causal link for WPI by demonstrating not just correlation but a clear mechanism of harm. We should also be prepared to counter the “cellophane fallacy” argument, asserting that observed “substitutes” are only viable due to super-competitive pricing, not true competitive alternatives, for abuse of dominance cases¹⁵.

3. Given the EU/UK/Spanish interplay, are there specific jurisdictional tactics (e.g., forum shopping, parallel proceedings) that could expedite or strengthen our legal challenge against the perpetrators or the regulatory bodies?

Regarding jurisdictional tactics, a range of solutions exists given the EU, UK, and Spanish interplay. These include initiating private enforcement actions in Spanish national courts, such as the Audiencia Nacional for administrative review and civil courts for damages¹⁶. Simultaneously, filing formal complaints with the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) or for general antitrust violations (Articles 101/102 TFEU) is a possibility¹⁷. Engaging with the UK Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) or Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) on specific UK-related harms, such as those related to foreign subsidies or market concentration studies, represents another avenue¹⁸. While challenging, exploring elements of a WTO challenge if Indonesia’s biodiesel subsidy policy has direct parallels is also an option¹⁹. Parallel proceedings, such as a complaint to the European Commission running concurrently with national court actions in Spain, strengthen the pressure on all parties.

The most viable tactical solution involves a coordinated multi-jurisdictional offensive, specifically pursuing the administrative appeal against the CNMC in Spain concurrently with a formal complaint to the European Commission under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and engaging with UK trade remedies processes. This is most viable because it applies pressure on multiple fronts, leverages distinct legal instruments (EU competition law, national administrative law, UK trade remedies), and creates a sense of sustained scrutiny that the perpetrators and regulators cannot easily ignore²⁰. It also allows us to gather evidence from different legal processes that can feed into and strengthen other ongoing actions.

4. What specific internal or public-facing vulnerabilities (e.g., past public statements, ongoing investigations not yet leveraged, internal contradictions in their business models) of Mediaset/Atresmedia or the implicated government departments can we exploit in court?

To exploit vulnerabilities, we can look at several areas. For Mediaset and Atresmedia, a significant vulnerability is their history of past CNMC sanctions for non-compliance with merger commitments, which establishes a pattern of behavior and demonstrates a repeated disregard for regulatory obligations²¹. Inconsistencies between their public statements or investor reports (e.g., claiming innovation and competition) and their actual market conduct, particularly regarding alleged anti-competitive practices like bundling and exclusivity, can be leveraged to expose hypocrisy²². Their alleged misuse of public funds, specifically NextGenerationEU funds, is a potent public-facing vulnerability due to its political sensitivity and potential for public outcry²³. For implicated government departments or the CNMC, their repeated dismissals of complaints, including ours, or their past sanctions for specific non-compliance followed by alleged continued non-enforcement, create a clear vulnerability around their “omission of duty” and “systemic errors”²⁴. Their reliance on a supposedly “ended vigilance period” for structural commitments, despite continuous market effects, could be a major point of attack²⁵.

The most viable approach is to expose the internal contradictions between the perpetrators’ public image and their alleged market behavior, particularly their claims of promoting a diverse media landscape while allegedly monopolizing advertising. This is most viable because it directly challenges their credibility and resonates powerfully with public interest concerns, amplifying our media campaign. Simultaneously, systematically documenting the CNMC’s historical pattern of imposing commitments, sanctioning breaches, and then allegedly failing to ensure continuous compliance creates a powerful narrative of regulatory failure and a direct target for legal challenge in Spanish administrative courts.

5. What precise questions should we pose to the CNMC or other regulators to expose deeper procedural impropriety or a lack of due diligence in their past oversight, beyond what we’ve already alleged?

To expose deeper procedural impropriety in regulatory oversight, we should pose precise questions regarding internal processes and decision-making. These questions could include: What specific criteria and data points were utilized by the CNMC to formally determine that the vigilance period for the Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments had definitively ended, and how was this assessment rigorously aligned with the observable, ongoing market effects of the duopoly? What internal methodologies or thresholds were employed to quantify “sufficient evidence” from COCOO’s detailed complaints, and how does this standard align with the CNMC’s foundational duty to act proactively on indications of market distortion, rather than solely reacting to formal complaints? What specific, documented steps were taken to actively monitor compliance with commitments after previous sanctions were issued against Mediaset, beyond merely collecting fines, to ensure genuine behavioral change and effective deterrence? Were all relevant cross-border market dynamics and their impact on Spanish competition explicitly considered and documented when evaluating the ongoing effects of the duopoly, in full alignment with EU law obligations and the principles of market integration? What internal protocols or guidelines exist for coordinating investigations and findings with other EU or UK competition authorities regarding multi-jurisdictional market distortions, and were these protocols fully activated and documented in the context of this specific case?

The most viable questions are those that force the CNMC to provide detailed justifications for their internal processes and specific decisions, particularly regarding the termination of vigilance and the sufficiency of evidence. This is most viable because it directly probes their adherence to administrative due process and exposes potential procedural flaws or a lack of due diligence that would significantly strengthen our administrative appeal against their inaction.

6. What specific questions should we ask ourselves or the parties to highlight COCOO’s unique blend of neutrality and unparalleled case-specific knowledge that makes us the optimal mediator?

To highlight COCOO’s unique mediation value, we should ask ourselves and the parties questions that underscore our distinct competencies. Internally, we should consider: How can we present our Wrongful Profit Impairment quantification in a simplified, non-adversarial manner during mediation that clearly articulates the scale of harm without immediately demanding payment, but rather identifies the problem that a mediated solution can address? How can we articulate our understanding of the duopoly’s complex business models, including their advertising bundling logic and content acquisition strategies, in a way that demonstrates empathy for their operational realities while simultaneously highlighting the market distortions, thereby showing problem-solving capability rather than mere accusation? To the parties, we could ask: “Given the inherent complexities of market dynamics in the Spanish audiovisual and advertising sectors, which involve intricate business models, specific regulatory commitments, and multi-faceted market power, what are the primary challenges you foresee in reaching a mutually agreeable resolution through traditional litigation alone?” “How might a mediator with a deep, evidence-based understanding of the specific market conditions, including its technical aspects and competitive nuances, simplify the negotiation process and help identify creative, win-win solutions that are both legally sound and commercially viable?”

The most viable approach is to leverage our WPI analysis as a neutral, expert tool for quantifying harm that can provide an objective baseline for settlement discussions, thus transitioning WPI from a litigation tool to a mediation enabler. This is most viable because it immediately demonstrates our capacity for objective, evidence-based problem-solving. Simultaneously, framing COCOO’s knowledge not as an accusatory weapon but as an analytical tool to identify the root causes of the conflict and propose practical, forward-looking market reforms that benefit all parties in the long run will be crucial for establishing our unique value as a mediator.

7. How can we frame questions to the perpetrators that subtly reveal their potential long-term benefits from a mediated settlement beyond just avoiding a lawsuit?

To subtly reveal the perpetrators’ potential long-term benefits from mediation, we could frame questions such as: “How might achieving a consolidated and predictable regulatory framework for advertising sales and content acquisition, formalized through a mediated agreement, provide your company with greater long-term business stability and reduce uncertainty compared to ongoing, fragmented litigation and potential future regulatory interventions?” “Considering the increasing scrutiny from both public opinion and investors regarding corporate governance and market conduct, how might a proactive, mediated resolution that clearly demonstrates a commitment to fair market practices enhance your company’s long-term reputation and potentially mitigate future regulatory risks or consumer advocacy actions?” “What potential operational efficiencies or market innovations might be unlocked if the current adversarial climate surrounding market practices is replaced by a cooperative framework for future market conduct, especially regarding equitable access to digital platforms or collaborative content distribution, thereby fostering a more predictable and sustainable competitive environment for the entire industry?”

The most viable approach is to focus questions on long-term strategic and operational benefits. By highlighting “regulatory certainty,” “reputational enhancement,” and “industry best practices,” we tap into their core long-term strategic interests, making a mediated settlement a more attractive commercial decision than continuous market disruption.

8. What information do we need from our prospective class members to present a consolidated, compelling picture of collective harm that drives the perpetrators to the mediation table, while also reassuring claimants about the benefits of mediation over litigation?

To present a consolidated and compelling picture of collective harm and reassure claimants, we need granular, verifiable data and compelling qualitative accounts. We should ask prospective class members for specific financial data, such as detailed advertising spend records that show increases in costs, evidence of being forced into bundled contracts, or documentation of reduced market share and suppressed revenues directly attributable to the duopoly’s alleged practices. We need concrete instances of being denied access to specific advertising slots or content licenses, or being subjected to unfair contract terms. For qualitative evidence, we should gather narratives describing the practical difficulties faced in competing or advertising effectively due to the duopoly’s dominance. To reassure claimants about mediation, we need to gather information on their primary concerns about litigation, including potential costs, time commitment, and public exposure, and then directly address these in our mediation proposal by highlighting the expedited, cost-effective, and confidential nature of mediated solutions.

The most viable approach is to secure granular, verifiable financial data from a representative sample of class members across all affected segments, including small and medium-sized advertisers, independent broadcasters, content producers, and local tech firms. This is most viable because quantifiable financial loss is the strongest driver for collective action and for motivating perpetrators to mediate. Simultaneously, openly addressing claimants’ anxieties about litigation while transparently communicating the expedited, cost-effective, and tailored nature of mediated solutions will build crucial trust and encourage their participation.

9. What are the most critical questions to ask about the ideal structure of a mediation process for a case of this complexity to ensure feasibility and maximize success?

To ensure feasibility and maximize success in a complex mediation, critical questions include: What are the absolute minimum non-negotiable outcomes each party requires for a settlement to be viable, covering both monetary and non-monetary aspects, and conversely, what are their absolute maximum concessions they are prepared to make? What specific data disclosure protocols can be mutually agreed upon by all parties to ensure sufficient transparency and trust during mediation without compromising legitimate commercial secrets, thereby avoiding information asymmetry? How can the confidentiality of the mediation process be rigorously maintained while simultaneously ensuring the enforceability of any resulting settlement and addressing the public interest mandate for transparency in market conduct? What would be the ideal composition of representatives from each side, ensuring they have full authority to negotiate and make binding decisions without constant external approvals? What specific mechanisms could be built into a settlement agreement to monitor ongoing compliance and provide for expedited dispute resolution if new breaches occur, thereby ensuring the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of the agreement?

The most viable questions are those that focus on the practicalities of data exchange, the precise scope of confidentiality, and the enforceability and monitoring of future agreements. This is most viable because it directly tackles the common challenges of complex mediations in competition law, paving the way for a workable process and a sustainable outcome that both compensates for past harms and prevents future anti-competitive conduct.

10. What are the common reasons mediation fails in competition law disputes, and what questions should we ask to pre-emptively address those challenges in our mediation USP?

Common reasons mediation fails in competition law disputes include a lack of genuine willingness to settle by one or more parties, significant information asymmetry leading to distrust, inability to agree on the quantification of damages, difficulties in designing effective forward-looking remedies that address systemic issues, and concerns about private settlements undermining public enforcement or setting negative precedents. To pre-empt these challenges in our Mediation USP, we should ask: How can COCOO’s rigorous, independent market analysis and WPI quantification effectively bridge the information asymmetry gap between parties, fostering a shared, objective understanding of the dispute’s economic reality and the scope of harm? What specific mechanisms can be incorporated into a mediated settlement to ensure its transparency and its alignment with broader public interest goals and regulatory enforcement mandates, thus addressing concerns about a “secret deal” that merely benefits the parties without wider accountability? How can COCOO’s expertise in designing effective structural and behavioral remedies provide creative solutions that are both legally sound and commercially acceptable, thereby moving beyond the limitations of traditional court-imposed judgments and avoiding the common pitfall of superficial fixes? How will all parties demonstrate a genuine commitment to engage in good faith negotiation, given the voluntary nature of mediation, and what steps will be taken to ensure negotiation authority and commitment from key decision-makers?

The most viable strategy is to directly confront the root causes of mediation failure by explicitly proposing COCOO’s solutions as the answers. By emphasizing our ability to provide objective economic data, design effective and enforceable remedies, and ensure transparency and alignment with public interest, we directly address the key impediments to successful mediation in complex competition law cases, thereby strengthening our Mediation USP and maximizing the likelihood of a positive outcome.

Mediaset has faced several sanctions from Spain’s National Commission of Markets and Competition (CNMC) for violations including anticompetitive practices, broadcasting inappropriate content, and breaching merger conditions. Fines have totaled in the tens of millions of euros, although one significant sanction was later annulled in court.

Anticompetitive Advertising Practices (2019)

In November 2019, the CNMC imposed a total fine of €77.1 million on Mediaset and Atresmedia for engaging in anticompetitive practices in the television advertising market¹¹¹¹.

• Mediaset’s Fine: Mediaset’s share of the fine amounted to €38.9 million².
• Violations: The CNMC found that the commercial policies of both companies restricted the ability of other television channels to compete for advertising revenue³. Mediaset and Atresmedia, which together controlled over 85% of the TV advertising market, engaged in several anti-competitive practices⁴:
  • They imposed high minimum investment shares on advertisers⁵.
  • They paid incentives, known as “extraprimas,” to media agencies for reaching a certain investment volume with their channels⁶.
  • They sold advertising in packages that bundled their most popular channels with less-watched ones⁷. This was reinforced by the “pauta única” (simulcast) system, which broadcast the same ad simultaneously across multiple channels in the package⁸.
• Resolution: The CNMC ordered both companies to modify their commercial strategies within three months⁹⁹⁹⁹.

Inappropriate Content and Covert Advertising (2022)

On April 25, 2022, the CNMC sanctioned Mediaset with fines totaling €674,358 for two separate infractions on its Telecinco channel¹⁰.

• Inappropriate Content (€373,002): Mediaset was fined for broadcasting content deemed inappropriate for viewers under 12 during a protected time slot¹¹. The incident occurred on April 15, 2021, during the program “Sálvame Naranja”¹². The content, which discussed the relationship between celebrities Rocío Carrasco and Antonio David, was considered potentially harmful to the physical, mental, or moral development of minors¹³.
• Covert Advertising (€301,356): A separate fine was issued for surreptitious advertising of products from the company “Los sabores de la Esteban, S.L”¹⁴. This occurred during “Sálvame Naranja” on April 23, 2021, and “Sálvame Deluxe” on May 1, 2021¹⁵. For this infraction, Mediaset acknowledged its responsibility and made an early payment of €180,813.60, receiving a 40% reduction on the fine¹⁶.

Breach of Merger Conditions and Annulled Sanction

A long-running case involved Mediaset’s breach of conditions tied to its 2010 acquisition of the television channel Cuatro^17171717.

• Background: When the merger was approved on October 28, 2010, Mediaset committed to not linking the sale of advertising on its Telecinco and Cuatro channels, either formally or in practice
• 2015 Sanction: On September 17, 2015, the CNMC imposed a €3 million fine on Mediaset for violating this commitment^19191919. The regulator determined that Mediaset had linked the channels by applying a discount policy based on a global investment quota across its entire group of channels²⁰²⁰. This was considered a repeat offense, following a previous sanction of €15.6 million for similar breaches in 2013^21212121.
• 2024 Court Annulment: However, the €3 million sanction from 2015 was annulled by Spain’s Audiencia Nacional in a ruling on December 10, 2024^22222222. The court found that Mediaset’s right to a defense had been violated²³²³²³. The CNMC had based its decision on information from advertisers but kept their identities and full, unredacted responses confidential^{242424242424242424}. The court ruled that this prevented Mediaset from being able to properly challenge the evidence used against it

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MEDIATION