LINKACTION

NEWS & CASE UPDATES

Research suggests Mediaset and Atresmedia likely control over 80% of Spain’s TV advertising market, based on historical data, supporting allegations of anti-competitive practices like bundled sales and minimum investment quotas that harm advertisers and smaller broadcasters. A recent 2025 CNMC fine of €500,000 on Atresmedia for covert ads strengthens Cocoo’s consumer protection claims, while a January 2025 National Court ruling overturning a €3 million Mediaset fine for procedural errors highlights CNMC’s vulnerabilities, potentially aiding judicial review efforts. However, the appeal status of the 2019 €77.1 million CNMC fine remains unclear, with no public updates, suggesting ongoing legal battles that could impact Cocoo’s strategy.

**Background and Allegations**
Cocoo, a UK-based non-profit, alleges that Mediaset España and Atresmedia, as a duopoly, engage in anti-competitive practices, including forcing advertisers into bundled packages, imposing high investment quotas, and securing exclusive content deals, violating EU and Spanish competition law. These actions inflate costs for advertisers, restrict market access for competitors like KISS Media, and reduce media plurality, harming consumers. The CNMC’s failure to enforce merger commitments and investigate new evidence, alongside alleged non-competitive allocation of €8.2 million in NextGenerationEU funds, supports claims of regulatory negligence and illegal state aid. Cross-border impacts on UK operators like BBC and ITV broaden the case’s scope.

**Recent Developments**
A July 2025 CNMC fine of €500,000 on Atresmedia for covert ads on La Sexta and Atresplayer, mislabeled as “cooking shows,” reinforces Cocoo’s consumer protection claims, showing ongoing deceptive practices. The January 2025 National Court ruling, overturning a €3 million Mediaset fine from 2015 for procedural errors, highlights CNMC’s investigative shortcomings, potentially strengthening Cocoo’s judicial review against regulatory negligence. The 2019 €77.1 million fine’s appeal status remains unresolved, with no updates since 2019, suggesting a prolonged legal process that could delay enforcement but doesn’t diminish its precedent for Cocoo’s claims.

**Legal Strategy**
Cocoo will pursue claims under Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC for abuse of dominance, Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC for anti-competitive agreements, and tortious liability for wrongful profit impairment, supported by economic theory on duopolies. Against the CNMC, judicial review under Ley 29/1998 will challenge regulatory negligence, leveraging the 2025 ruling’s precedent. State liability claims under the Francovich doctrine target EU law breaches, particularly AVMSD/EMFA enforcement. Multi-jurisdictional actions, including EU complaints and UK CMA engagement, will maximize pressure, especially given cross-border impacts.

**Monetization Approach**
Cocoo will seek collective action damages, estimating tens of millions based on CNMC fines, with a 20-30% contingency fee. A pilot mediation at €50,000-€100,000, costs split, could lead to larger settlements. Unsolicited proposals to UK, EU, and Spanish procurement portals for consultancy services could yield €100,000-€500,000 contracts, funding operations. Cost-effective campaigns on LinkedIn, X, and Meta, using free tools, will recruit claimants, while donations and third-party funding reduce costs.

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### Comprehensive Analysis for Cocoo v. Mediaset/Atresmedia

This analysis integrates recent news and updates to enhance Cocoo’s case against Mediaset España, Atresmedia, and the CNMC, focusing on alleged anti-competitive practices, breaches of merger commitments, and regulatory failures in Spain’s television advertising and broadcasting markets. As Cocoo’s solicitor, the mission is to secure a victory by leveraging all available evidence and opportunities, incorporating findings from online searches conducted at 11:37 PM BST on Wednesday, July 2, 2025.

#### Case Context and Allegations
Cocoo alleges that Mediaset España and Atresmedia form a duopoly controlling over 85% of Spain’s TV advertising market, engaging in practices like forced bundling, minimum investment quotas, exclusive content acquisition, price discrimination, and technological obstruction, violating Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC. These actions harm advertisers (e.g., SMEs, Publicis), smaller broadcasters (e.g., KISS Media), and consumers by inflating costs, restricting market access, and reducing media plurality. The CNMC’s failure to enforce merger commitments, such as the Telecinco/Cuatro 22% audience cap, and its dismissal of new evidence constitute regulatory negligence, actionable under Ley 29/1998 and the Francovich doctrine. Alleged non-competitive allocation of €8.2 million in NextGenerationEU funds to Mediaset’s subsidiary Gestmusic Endemol supports claims of illegal state aid under Article 107 TFEU. Cross-border effects on UK operators (e.g., BBC, ITV) and violations of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (Article 7) expand the case’s scope. SGAE’s near-100% control over musical rights management, reinforced by exclusive contracts, further implicates anti-competitive practices.

#### Recent News and Updates
Searches for news and updates revealed two significant developments from 2025 that could impact Cocoo’s case:

1. **July 2025 CNMC Fine on Atresmedia (€500,000)**: The CNMC issued a €500,000 fine on Atresmedia for covert advertising on La Sexta and Atresplayer, mislabeling commercials as “cooking shows” without proper identification, violating Spanish TV law. This fine, detailed at [invalid url, do not cite], reinforces Cocoo’s consumer protection claims under Spanish consumer laws, showing ongoing deceptive practices that mislead viewers, aligning with allegations of hidden advertising in programs like Sálvame Naranja. This strengthens tortious liability claims for consumer harm and public nuisance, supporting Cocoo’s argument of a pattern of anti-competitive and unethical behavior.

2. **January 2025 National Court Ruling on Mediaset Fine**: The National Court revoked a €3 million CNMC fine from 2015 imposed on Mediaset for breaching Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments, finding procedural errors in the CNMC’s handling of confidential advertiser data, violating Mediaset’s right to defense, as reported at [invalid url, do not cite]. This ruling, while for a different case, highlights CNMC’s investigative vulnerabilities, potentially aiding Cocoo’s judicial review under Ley 29/1998 for regulatory negligence. It suggests the CNMC’s processes may be challenged on procedural grounds, supporting claims of omission of duty and state liability under the Francovich doctrine.

Searches for updates on the 2019 €77.1 million CNMC fine’s appeal yielded no new outcomes, with both Mediaset and Atresmedia announcing appeals in 2019 but no public resolution found, suggesting the appeal remains pending or unresolved. This ongoing legal battle, while not diminishing the fine’s precedent, indicates prolonged enforcement delays, potentially weakening CNMC’s regulatory effectiveness, which Cocoo can leverage to argue systemic failure.

#### Impact on Case Success
These updates significantly enhance Cocoo’s chances of success by providing fresh evidence and legal leverage:

– The 2025 Atresmedia fine strengthens consumer protection claims, offering a recent example of deceptive practices that align with Cocoo’s allegations, supporting tortious liability and public interest arguments. It can be used in mediation to demand stricter advertising transparency and in legal filings to argue ongoing harm.

– The 2025 National Court ruling on Mediaset’s 2015 fine provides a precedent for challenging CNMC procedures, reinforcing Cocoo’s judicial review strategy. It highlights CNMC’s potential procedural flaws, supporting claims of regulatory negligence and state liability, particularly under the Francovich doctrine for EU law breaches.

– The unresolved 2019 fine appeal, while a gap, underscores CNMC’s enforcement challenges, which Cocoo can use to argue systemic regulatory failure, strengthening calls for judicial intervention and state accountability.

#### Strategic Recommendations
To incorporate these updates, Cocoo should:

– **Legal Strategy**: File a judicial review citing the 2025 National Court ruling to challenge CNMC’s dismissal of new evidence, arguing procedural parallels. Escalate to the European Commission under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, leveraging the Atresmedia fine as evidence of ongoing consumer harm. Pursue tort claims for the 2025 fine, emphasizing consumer deception.

– **Media Campaign**: Highlight the 2025 Atresmedia fine in campaigns on LinkedIn, X, and Meta, targeting SMEs and consumers with messages like “Atresmedia’s covert ads fined €500,000 – join Cocoo for fair advertising.” Use the National Court ruling to criticize CNMC’s oversight, amplifying public pressure for regulatory reform.

– **Mediation**: Propose a pilot mediation focusing on the 2025 fine, demanding transparency commitments and compensation for affected viewers, positioning Cocoo as a neutral facilitator. Use the unresolved 2019 fine to argue for urgent resolution, citing enforcement delays.

– **Monetization**: Seek damages for the 2025 fine’s impact, estimating consumer harm at €500,000+, with Cocoo taking a 20-30% fee. Target consultancy contracts with UK, EU, and Spanish bodies for media regulation, leveraging these updates to secure €100,000-€500,000 contracts.

#### Conclusion
The 2025 developments significantly bolster Cocoo’s case, offering fresh evidence and legal leverage. By integrating these updates into legal, campaign, and mediation strategies, Cocoo can maximize success, securing compensation and advancing market fairness. Immediate steps include filing a judicial review, launching a targeted campaign, and proposing mediation, ensuring all evidence is utilized effectively.

GEMINI’S CHOSEN SEARCHLINKS

The legal strategy encompasses:

Against Mediaset and Atresmedia:
- Abuse of Dominant Position (Article 102 TFEU, Article 2 LDC): Forced bundling, minimum quotas, exclusive content deals, price discrimination, technological obstruction, and failure to invest in European works.
- Anti-Competitive Agreements (Article 101 TFEU, Article 1 LDC): Tacit collusion via synchronized pricing and “pauta única” simulcast.
- Unfair Competition (Article 3 LDC): Bundling with SGAE rights and permanence clauses.
- Breach of Merger Commitments: Violations of Telecinco/Cuatro and Antena 3/La Sexta commitments.
- Tortious Liability: Wrongful Profit Impairment (WPI) for economic harm to competitors and advertisers, and public nuisance for reduced media plurality.
- Contract Violations: Void advertising contracts due to anti-competitive terms and economic duress.
- Consumer and Investor Violations: Hidden advertising, inappropriate content, and market distortion deterring investment.
Against CNMC:
- Regulatory Negligence: Failure to enforce commitments and investigate, actionable under Ley 40/2015 and Francovich doctrine.
- Omission of Duty: Refusal to reopen Telecinco/Cuatro expediente, challengeable via judicial review (Ley 29/1998).
Against Public Authorities:
- Illegal State Aid: Non-competitive NextGenerationEU funds, violating Article 107 TFEU.
- Public Procurement Breaches: Non-compliance with EU Directive 2014/24/EU.
- Failure to Ensure Media Plurality: Inadequate AVMSD/EMFA enforcement.
Against SGAE:
- Abuse of Dominance and Anti-Competitive Agreements: Exclusive rights contracts violating Article 102 and 101 TFEU.

Findings of Infringement

Documented infringements include:

CNMC’s 2019 decision (S/DC/0617/17) fining Mediaset €38.9 million and Atresmedia €38.2 million for anti-competitive advertising practices (minimum quotas, extraprimas, bundling), ordering practice changes.
2022 CNMC fines on Mediaset (€674,358) for inappropriate content and covert advertising in Sálvame Naranja and Deluxe.
Mediaset’s 2013 (€15.6 million) and 2015 (€3 million, annulled 2024 due to procedural errors) fines for merger commitment breaches.
EU case T-177/07 (2010, 2014) upholding illegal state aid to Mediaset, recovering €5 million.
European Commission’s May 2025 preliminary closure of Cocoo’s complaint, challenged for overlooking cross-border effects and AVMSD/EMFA non-compliance.

Selected Search Links and Strategies

The following links were proactively selected from the provided list for their potential to yield scientific, legal, and industry-specific evidence, deepening the analysis of competition law violations, regulatory failures, and public interest harms. Each strategy leverages the causes of action and infringements to design precise keyword combinations and search options, ensuring granular evidence collection.

https://www.cnmc.es/
This is the Spanish National Commission for Markets and Competition’s official website, hosting decisions, reports, and market studies relevant to Mediaset and Atresmedia’s infringements.

Search Strategy: Use the site’s search function to locate decisions and reports on “Mediaset España”, “Atresmedia”, “televisión en abierto”, “publicidad televisiva”, and “prácticas anticompetitivas”. Target specific case numbers like S/DC/0617/17 (2019 advertising fine) and C/0230/10 (Telecinco/Cuatro merger) to retrieve detailed rulings, sanctions, and compliance reports. Search for “compromisos de fusión” to find updates on merger commitment enforcement, addressing breach of commitments and regulatory negligence claims. Use “ayudas de estado” to uncover evidence of non-competitive NextGenerationEU fund allocations, supporting illegal state aid claims. Filter by date (2019-2025) to focus on recent developments and check for market studies on TV advertising to quantify market shares, supporting abuse of dominance claims.
Expected Evidence: Detailed CNMC decisions, sanction reports, and market data confirming anti-competitive practices, merger violations, and regulatory inaction, strengthening claims under Article 101, 102 TFEU, and Ley 29/1998.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
The EU’s official legal portal provides access to legislation, case law, and directives, critical for competition law and state aid evidence.

Search Strategy: Use the advanced search at [invalid url, do not cite] with keywords “T-177/07”, “Mediaset state aid”, “television broadcasting”, “AVMSD”, “EMFA”, and “competition law” AND “media plurality”. Filter by document type (judgments, decisions, directives) and date (2007-2025) to retrieve T-177/07 details and related cases on media mergers or advertising practices. Search “Article 107 TFEU” AND “audiovisual” to find state aid cases, supporting claims of illegal NextGenerationEU funding. Use “Directive 2010/13/EU” (AVMSD) and “Regulation 2024/1083” (EMFA) to identify Spain’s transposition failures, bolstering state liability claims. Combine “abuse of dominance” AND “media” to uncover precedents for Article 102 TFEU violations.
Expected Evidence: Court judgments, Commission decisions, and directives confirming state aid violations, media regulation breaches, and competition law precedents, supporting claims against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and public authorities.

https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/searchCaseInstruments
This EU competition case database is ideal for finding cases on media sector anti-competitive practices and state aid.

Search Strategy: Use the case search tool with keywords “Mediaset”, “Atresmedia”, “television advertising”, “state aid” AND “media”, and “abuse of dominance”. Filter by case type (state aid, antitrust, mergers) and sector (media, broadcasting) to locate cases like T-177/07 or M.1574 (Kirch/Mediaset merger). Search “Spain” AND “audiovisual” to find related cases, supporting cross-border impact claims. Use “Article 101 TFEU” and “Article 102 TFEU” to identify precedents for anti-competitive agreements and dominance abuse, aligning with Cocoo’s allegations. Check for recent investigations (2020-2025) to uncover new evidence of ongoing practices.
Expected Evidence: Case documents detailing EU investigations, decisions, and fines, reinforcing anti-competitive practices and state aid claims, supporting Article 101, 102 TFEU, and tortious liability.

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority
The UK CMA’s website offers market studies and cases relevant to cross-border impacts on UK operators.

Search Strategy: Use the search function at [invalid url, do not cite] with keywords “media market study”, “digital advertising”, “state aid” AND “media”, and “cross-border competition”. Focus on the 2019-2020 Online Platforms and Digital Advertising Market Study for parallels to TV advertising concentration. Search “BBC” OR “ITV” AND “competition” to find evidence of UK operator impacts, supporting EU-UK Trade Agreement claims. Filter by document type (market studies, case decisions) and date (2019-2025) to identify recent reports on media competition or state aid. Use “merger control” AND “media” to uncover UK-relevant precedents.
Expected Evidence: Market studies, case decisions, and guidance on digital advertising and media competition, supporting cross-border harm and investor violation claims.

https://www.bailii.org/
The British and Irish Legal Information Institute provides UK case law, potentially offering precedents for competition or media regulation.

Search Strategy: Use the search tool with keywords “competition law” AND “media”, “abuse of dominance” AND “advertising”, “state aid” AND “broadcasting”, and “media plurality”. Filter by court (Competition Appeal Tribunal, High Court) and date (2015-2025) to find recent cases. Search “Sky” OR “ITV” AND “competition” to identify UK operator impacts, supporting cross-border claims. Use “unfair competition” to find analogous cases for Article 3 LDC violations. Check for cases involving regulatory negligence to bolster CNMC claims.
Expected Evidence: UK judgments on competition law or media regulation, providing precedents for abuse of dominance, unfair competition, and regulatory failures.

https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
The ECHR database is critical for cases on freedom of expression and media plurality, supporting public interest claims.

Search Strategy: Use the advanced search with keywords “freedom of expression” AND “media”, “media plurality”, “Spain” AND “media”, and “Article 10 ECHR”. Filter by state (Spain), violation type (Article 10), and date (2010-2025) to find cases on media concentration or regulatory failures. Search “broadcasting” AND “competition” to uncover precedents linking media freedom to market practices, supporting tortious public nuisance claims. Use “consumer protection” to find related consumer rights cases.
Expected Evidence: ECHR rulings on media freedom and plurality, supporting claims of public harm and state liability for AVMSD/EMFA failures.

https://globaltradealert.org/data-center
This database tracks trade distortions, including state aid, relevant to illegal

MY SEARCHLINKS

– **https://eur-lex.europa.eu/**: Use the advanced search to find EU competition law cases involving Mediaset or Atresmedia, focusing on state aid (e.g., T-177/07), mergers, or anti-competitive practices. Search terms include “Mediaset,” “Atresmedia,” “state aid,” “competition law,” and “audiovisual media services directive.” Check for recent updates on AVMSD or EMFA, relevant to media plurality claims, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/business-and-property-courts**: Search for UK court cases involving Mediaset, Atresmedia, or similar media companies, focusing on competition law or media regulation. Use terms like “media competition,” “advertising practices,” or “state aid” to find judgments or guidance, potentially at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/advanced-search**: Search for UK subsidiaries of Mediaset or Atresmedia, using company names and SIC codes like 60.20 (television broadcasting) or 73.11 (advertising agencies). Look for filings, accounts, or legal actions that indicate market presence or cross-border impacts, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://resources.companieshouse.gov.uk/sic/**: Identify SIC codes for media and advertising sectors (e.g., 60.20, 73.11) to map competitors and claimants, aiding in defining the market for abuse of dominance claims. Use this to refine searches for affected companies, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://petition.parliament.uk/**: Check for UK petitions on media competition, advertising practices, or state aid, using terms like “media concentration,” “TV advertising,” or “state aid.” These can build public support, potentially at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-financial-interests/parliamentary-commissioner-for-standards/registers-of-interests/register-of-members-financial-interests/**: Search for MPs with financial interests in media or advertising, using terms like “media company shares” or “advertising consultancy,” to identify potential allies or conflicts, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.theyworkforyou.com/interests/**: Similar to above, search for MPs or Lords with media sector interests, using terms like “broadcasting” or “advertising,” to build political support, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/**: Search for ECHR cases on freedom of expression, media freedom, or competition law, using terms like “media plurality,” “freedom of expression,” or “Spain,” for precedents, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/have-your-say**: Check for consultations on competition law, media regulation, or state aid, using terms like “AVMSD,” “EMFA,” or “media concentration,” to influence policy, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/**: Search historical UK government records for media regulation or competition law documents, using terms like “media competition 1990s” or “state aid TV,” for background, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/register-of-consultant-lobbyists**: Check for Mediaset, Atresmedia, or related lobbying in the UK, using terms like “media lobbying” or “advertising regulation,” for influence evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.lobbying.scot/**: Search for Scottish lobbying by Mediaset or Atresmedia, using similar terms, for cross-border impact, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://casetracker.justice.gov.uk/**: Search for UK court cases involving Mediaset, Atresmedia, or competition law, using terms like “media competition” or “advertising practices,” for legal precedents, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/royal-courts-of-justice-cause-list**: Check upcoming UK court cases for Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “media” or “competition,” for ongoing actions, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/**: Search for UK tenders involving media or advertising, using terms like “media consultancy” or “advertising services,” for non-competitive procurement evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.lobbyfacts.eu/**: Check EU lobbying by Mediaset, Atresmedia, or parents, using terms like “media regulation” or “competition law,” for influence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en**: Search press releases for competition law cases involving Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “state aid” or “media concentration,” for updates, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/**: Check for consumer disputes involving Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “advertising complaints” or “media services,” for consumer harm evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://europa.eu/youreurope/business/finance-funding/getting-funding/tenders/index_en.htm**: Identify EU tenders for media or competition law, using terms like “media regulation” or “competition consultancy,” for proposal opportunities, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.ajbell.co.uk/market-research/screener/shares**: Check UK-listed media companies, using terms like “broadcasting” or “advertising,” for financial data on Mediaset or competitors, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.ajbell.co.uk/markets/investment-trusts**: Search investment trusts in media, using terms like “media investment,” for reports on sector dynamics, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/**: Search UK government reports on competition law or media, using terms like “media concentration” or “state aid,” for supporting evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations**: Identify relevant UK bodies like CMA or Ofcom, using terms like “competition authority” or “media regulator,” for reports, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.londonstockexchange.com/live-markets/market-data-dashboard/price-explorer**: Check LSE listings for Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “media shares,” for market data, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.bidstats.uk/**: Search UK procurement statistics for media tenders, using terms like “media contracts” or “advertising services,” for patterns, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm**: Check WTO disputes involving Spain or EU on media, using terms like “state aid” or “media competition,” for precedents, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.oge.gov/**: Check US ethics guidelines, using terms like “conflict of interest,” for analogies, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.congress.gov/**: Search US legislation on media competition, using terms like “advertising regulation,” for comparisons, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://worldwide.espacenet.com/**: Search patents by Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “advertising technology,” for market strategy evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://ppubs.uspto.gov/**: Similar to above, search US patents, using terms like “media delivery,” for additional context, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.pacer.gov/**: Search US court cases involving Mediaset, using terms like “competition law,” for precedents, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.usaspending.gov/**: Check US government spending on media, using terms like “media contracts,” for cross-border evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.wipo.int/branddb/en/**: Search trademarks by Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “advertising brand,” for market presence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.openownership.org/en/register/**: Search ownership of Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “Fininvest,” for corporate structure, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.infocif.es/**: Search Spanish company details for Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “financial statements,” for market dominance evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.hacienda.gob.es/es-ES/SecretariaDeEstadoDeFuncionPublica/OficinaConflictoIntereses/Paginas/DeclaracionesdealtoscargosdelaAGE.aspx**: Check Spanish officials’ interest declarations, using terms like “CNMC conflict,” for impartiality evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.congresodiputados.es/**: Search Spanish parliamentary debates on media, using terms like “media competition,” for policy context, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.cnmv.es/**: Search CNMV reports on Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “financial reports,” for market data, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.cnmc.es/**: Search CNMC decisions on Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “anti-competitive practices,” for infringement evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://transparencia.gencat.cat/**: Check Catalan transparency data, using terms like “media contracts,” for regional insights, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://consultas.oepm.es/**: Search Spanish patent office for Mediaset or Atresmedia patents, using terms like “advertising tech,” for strategy evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.publicadorconcursal.es/**: Check insolvency data for Mediaset or Atresmedia, using terms like “company insolvency,” for financial health, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.boe.es/buscar/concursos.php**: Search Spanish insolvency proceedings, using terms like “media companies,” for financial context, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://contrataciondelestado.es/**: Search Spanish public contracts, using terms like “media tenders,” for non-competitive evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.infosubvenciones.es/**: Check Spanish subsidies, using terms like “Mediaset subsidies,” for state aid evidence, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.registradores.org/**: Search Spanish company registry, using terms like “Mediaset ownership,” for corporate details, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://www.registradores.org/actualidad/portal-estadistico-registral/estadisticas-mercantiles**: Check Spanish mercantile statistics, using terms like “media sector,” for market data, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **http://app.bde.es/rss_www/**: Check Bank of Spain reports, using terms like “media market,” for economic insights, at [invalid url, do not cite].

– **https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions_en**: Check EU trade policies, using terms like “media trade,” for cross-border impacts, at [invalid url, do not cite].

These strategies ensure comprehensive evidence gathering, aligning with Cocoo’s mission to win the case through legal, campaign, and mediation efforts.

Direct Answer

**Key Points**
Research suggests Mediaset and Atresmedia hold significant market power in Spain’s TV advertising, likely over 80%, based on historical data, supporting claims of anti-competitive practices. The evidence leans toward their dominance causing harm to advertisers and competitors, with past CNMC fines and EU state aid cases reinforcing these allegations. However, exact 2023 market shares are hard to confirm without recent reports, and regulatory inaction by the CNMC remains controversial, complicating the case.

**Background and Allegations**
The Mediaset case centers on claims that Mediaset España and Atresmedia, controlling much of Spain’s TV ad market, engage in anti-competitive practices like bundled advertising and minimum investment quotas, harming advertisers and smaller broadcasters. The CNMC’s past fines, such as the 2019 €77.1 million penalty, and EU state aid case T-177/07 show a pattern of market distortion. Cocoo, as a non-profit, aims to secure compensation for affected parties and restore fair competition.

**Legal Strategy**
We’ll pursue claims under EU and Spanish competition law, including abuse of dominance and anti-competitive agreements, and tort claims for wrongful profit impairment due to their market structure. Against the CNMC, we’ll challenge regulatory negligence via judicial review, leveraging Ley 29/1998. Cross-border effects on UK operators, like BBC or ITV, could involve the European Commission or UK CMA, expanding our reach.

**Monetization Approach**
To win, we’ll seek damages through collective action, estimating tens of millions based on CNMC fines, with Cocoo taking a 20-30% fee. A pilot mediation at €50,000-€100,000, split among parties, could lead to larger settlements. Unsolicited proposals to UK, EU, and Spanish procurement for consultancy services could yield €100,000-€500,000 contracts, funding operations. Campaigns on LinkedIn, X, and Meta will recruit claimants using free tools, ensuring cost-effective outreach.

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### Survey Note: Comprehensive Analysis for Cocoo v. Mediaset/Atresmedia

This survey note provides a detailed examination of the Mediaset case, integrating findings from the specified search links and WordPress content to support Cocoo’s legal strategy, media campaign, and mediation efforts. As Cocoo’s solicitor, the mission is to secure a victory by leveraging all available evidence and opportunities to address alleged anti-competitive practices, breaches of merger commitments, and regulatory failures by Mediaset España, Atresmedia, and the CNMC in Spain’s television advertising and broadcasting markets.

#### Case Context and Allegations
The Mediaset case, as outlined in Cocoo’s WordPress content, alleges that Mediaset España and Atresmedia form a duopoly controlling over 85% of the Spanish TV advertising market, engaging in practices like forced bundling, minimum investment quotas, and exclusive content acquisition, violating EU and Spanish competition law (Article 102 TFEU, Article 2 LDC). These actions harm advertisers, smaller broadcasters, and consumers by inflating costs, restricting market access, and reducing media plurality. The CNMC’s alleged regulatory negligence, including failing to enforce merger commitments and dismissing new evidence, exacerbates these harms, potentially triggering state liability under the Francovich doctrine. Cross-border effects, impacting UK operators like BBC and ITV, and violations of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (Article 7), expand the case’s scope.

#### Findings from Search Links
Research using the provided links yielded valuable insights, though some were less directly applicable. The link [invalid url, do not cite] confirmed the state aid case T-177/07, where the EU General Court in 2010 and Court of Justice in 2014 upheld the Commission’s ruling that Italy’s €110 million digital decoder subsidies were illegal, benefiting Mediaset with approximately €5 million recovered. This historical case, detailed at [invalid url, do not cite], supports claims of a pattern of market distortion through government support, reinforcing Cocoo’s allegations of illegal state aid in Spain, particularly the €8.2 million NextGenerationEU funds to Mediaset’s subsidiary Gestmusic Endemol.

Eurostat ([invalid url, do not cite]) was searched for television advertising market share data in Spain, but specific figures for 2023 were not directly accessible. However, web searches using the data revealed that in 2017, Mediaset held 43.3% and Atresmedia 41.4% of the TV ad market, totaling 84.7%, as per Advanced Television ([invalid url, do not cite]). For 2022, Mediaset’s advertising revenue was €762 million, representing 41% of the total TV ad market, estimated at €1.86 billion, while Atresmedia’s TV revenue was €884.2 million, suggesting a combined dominance likely exceeding 80%. Recent reports, such as from Reuters Institute ([invalid url, do not cite]), indicate TV ad revenues remained flat at €1.7bn in 2023, but exact shares require further industry data from Infoadex, not publicly detailed here.

The link [invalid url, do not cite] provided insights into media concentration, with reports like “Media Concentration in Spain: National, sectorial, and regional groups” ([invalid url, do not cite]) identifying 50 media groups, highlighting the duopoly’s dominance. RSF’s page on Spain ([invalid url, do not cite]) noted government plans to tackle high media concentration, aligning with Cocoo’s public interest claims. The CMA’s website ([invalid url, do not cite]) and related searches showed market studies into digital advertising, like the 2019-2020 study on online platforms, uncovering market power issues with Google and Facebook, offering parallels for TV advertising concentration ([invalid url, do not cite]). BAILII ([invalid url, do not cite]) searches for “media competition” yielded no direct cases, but UK competition law principles remain relevant for cross-border arguments.

Other links, such as [invalid url, do not cite] [invalid url, do not cite] [invalid url, do not cite] and [invalid url, do not cite], were less relevant, focusing on trade data or UK-specific violations with no direct Mediaset links, while [invalid url, do not cite] and [invalid url, do not cite] required real-time access beyond capabilities, yielding no new findings.

#### Possible Causes of Action
Cocoo’s legal strategy encompasses multiple causes of action, detailed as follows:

– **Against Mediaset and Atresmedia**:
– **Abuse of Dominant Position**: Their market share, likely over 80%, supports claims under Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC for forced bundling, minimum quotas, exclusive content deals, price discrimination, technological obstruction, and failure to invest in European works, all restricting competition.
– **Anti-Competitive Agreements**: Tacit collusion in pricing and bundling, facilitated by “pauta única,” violates Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC, distorting market dynamics.
– **Unfair Competition**: Bundling with SGAE rights or imposing permanence clauses exploits market power, violating Article 3 LDC.
– **Breach of Merger Commitments**: Mediaset’s violations of Telecinco/Cuatro commitments (e.g., 22% audience cap, no tied sales) and Atresmedia’s similar breaches post-Antena 3/La Sexta merger, documented in CNMC sanctions, trigger liability.
– **Tortious Liability**: Wrongful Profit Impairment (WPI) claims, supported by the strict liability paper, address economic harm to competitors and advertisers, and public harm to media plurality, constituting tortious interference and public nuisance.
– **Contract Violations**: Advertising contracts with bundled sales or quotas are void under competition law, and economic duress claims are viable due to lack of alternatives. Consumer violations include hidden advertising and inappropriate content, impacting investor trust.

– **Against the CNMC**:
– **Regulatory Negligence**: Failure to enforce commitments and investigate new evidence, as seen in dismissed complaints, breaches Ley 40/2015 and EU law, actionable under the Francovich doctrine.
– **Omission of Duty**: Refusing to reopen the Telecinco/Cuatro expediente, claiming vigilance ended, violates Ley 29/1998, challengeable via judicial review.

– **Against Public Authorities**:
– **Illegal State Aid**: Non-competitive €8.2 million NextGenerationEU funds to Gestmusic Endemol violate Article 107 TFEU, rendering contracts void.
– **Public Procurement Breaches**: Non-competitive tenders violate EU Directive 2014/24/EU, supporting challenges.
– **Failure to Enforce EU Directives**: Inadequate AVMSD/EMFA implementation undermines media plurality, potentially ultra vires.

– **Against SGAE**:
– **Abuse of Dominance**: Near-100% control over musical rights, reinforced by exclusive contracts, violates Article 102 TFEU.
– **Anti-Competitive Agreements**: Bundling rights with advertising deals violates Article 101 TFEU, voiding contracts.

#### Findings of Infringement
Documented infringements include:
– CNMC’s 2019 decision (S/DC/0617/17) fining Mediaset €38.9 million and Atresmedia €38.2 million for anti-competitive advertising, including quotas and bundling, ordering practice changes.
– 2022 CNMC fines on Mediaset (€674,358) for inappropriate content and covert advertising in Sálvame Naranja and Deluxe.
– Mediaset’s 2013 (€15.6 million) and 2015 (€3 million, annulled 2024 due to procedural errors) fines for merger commitment breaches, confirming non-compliance.
– EU case T-177/07 (2010, 2014) upheld illegal state aid, recovering €5 million from Mediaset, detailed at [invalid url, do not cite].
– European Commission’s May 2025 preliminary closure of Cocoo’s complaint, challenged for overlooking cross-border effects, at [invalid url, do not cite].

#### Insights and Strategy
Research suggests the duopoly’s behavior is a predictable outcome of scarce inputs (DTT spectrum, premium content), reducing compliance, as per the strict liability paper. The CNMC’s procedural errors and dismissals highlight systemic failures, strengthening negligence claims. Cross-border impacts on UK operators, confirmed by CMA parallels in digital advertising, expand jurisdictional options. Public interest, particularly media plurality, amplifies campaign resonance, with RSF reports noting government plans to tackle concentration, at [invalid url, do not cite]. Evidentiary needs include advertiser spend data, internal communications, and WPI analysis. Jurisdictional tactics involve Spanish judicial review, EU complaints under Foreign Subsidies Regulation, and UK CMA engagement, leveraging CMA’s market study approach at [invalid url, do not cite].

#### Monetization Strategies
To win, Cocoo will pursue collective action damages, estimating tens of millions based on CNMC fines, with a 20-30% contingency fee. A pilot mediation at €50,000-€100,000, costs split, could lead to €500,000+ contracts, positioning Cocoo as a facilitator. Unsolicited proposals to UK (RM6098, [invalid url, do not cite]), EU (TED, [invalid url, do not cite]), and Spanish portals for consultancy services could yield €100,000-€500,000, funding operations. Campaigns on LinkedIn, X, and Meta, using free tools like Google operators, will recruit claimants, ensuring cost-effective outreach. Donations and sponsorships from associations like AEA, targeting €50,000-€100,000, and third-party litigation funding (30-40% share) will reduce costs.

#### Conclusion
Cocoo’s case is robust, supported by market data, historical infringements, and economic theory. Legal actions, a targeted campaign, and mediation can secure significant compensation and revenue, advancing market fairness. Immediate steps include collecting advertiser data, filing a judicial review, and proposing a pilot mediation, leveraging all available evidence and jurisdictional avenues.

Possible causes of action against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC are grounded in competition law, tortious liability, contract law, and public interest violations, drawing from the WordPress content and prior research. Under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2 of the Spanish Law on Defence of Competition, Mediaset and Atresmedia are accused of abusing their collective dominant position in the television advertising market, where they control over 85% of the market share. Their practices include forcing advertisers to purchase bundled advertising packages, linking premium channels like Telecinco and Antena 3 with less desirable ones like Cuatro or La Sexta, violating merger commitments such as the 22% audience cap for Telecinco/Cuatro. They impose minimum investment quotas, requiring advertisers to allocate over 70% of their budgets to their channels, which forecloses smaller competitors like KISS Media or digital platforms. Exclusive content acquisition contracts, often exceeding three to five years for premium content like La Liga or major films, restrict competitors’ access to attractive programming. Price discrimination, offering up to 40% discounts to large advertisers while charging SMEs standard rates, distorts competition. Alleged technological obstruction, such as delaying UHD Digital Terrestrial Television deployment, and Mediaset’s failure to meet the mandatory 5% investment in European audiovisual works further constitute abusive practices.

Under Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC, their parallel conduct in pricing, bundling, and market strategies suggests tacit collusion in a transparent market with rigid supply due to limited DTT spectrum and TVE’s exit from advertising. The “pauta única” simulcast system, broadcasting ads across multiple channels, reinforces this coordination. These practices may also violate Article 3 LDC as unfair competition, particularly when bundling advertising with SGAE musical rights contracts or imposing permanence clauses. Mediaset’s repeated breaches of Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments, prohibiting tied sales and setting audience caps, and Atresmedia’s similar practices post-Antena 3/La Sexta merger, indicate systemic non-compliance, forming a distinct cause of action.

In tort law, the Wrongful Profit Impairment framework, supported by the academic paper on strict liability in duopolies with scarce inputs, establishes liability for economic and public harms. The duopoly’s practices, driven by scarce inputs like DTT spectrum and premium content, reduce “care” in regulatory compliance and media plurality, causing economic harm to competitors like smaller broadcasters and digital platforms through lost revenue and market access. Advertisers, particularly SMEs and agencies like Publicis or WPP, face inflated costs and reduced marketing efficiency. The public suffers from reduced media plurality and potential information manipulation, violating rights under Article 11 of the EU Charter and Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution. These actions constitute tortious interference with economic relations and public nuisance due to their impact on market fairness and information diversity.

Contractually, advertising contracts imposing bundled sales or minimum quotas are void under Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC for restricting competition. Advertisers, coerced into these terms due to the duopoly’s dominance, can claim economic duress, rendering contracts voidable. Merger commitments, though quasi-contractual, are legally binding, and their violation supports damages claims. Consumer protection violations arise from hidden advertising in programs like Sálvame Naranja and broadcasting inappropriate content during protected hours, breaching Spanish consumer laws. Investors face harm from a distorted market, potentially violating Article 7 of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

Against the CNMC, regulatory negligence under Ley 40/2015 and the Francovich doctrine is actionable due to its failure to enforce merger commitments and investigate new evidence, enabling ongoing market harm. Its claim that the vigilance period has ended is challengeable via judicial review under Ley 29/1998. Public authorities, such as the Ministry of Economy or Culture, face liability for illegal state aid under Article 107 TFEU, notably the alleged €8.2 million non-competitive allocation of NextGenerationEU funds to Mediaset’s subsidiary Gestmusic Endemol, and for breaching EU Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement. Failure to enforce the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and European Media Freedom Act supports claims of regulatory failure. SGAE’s near-100% control over musical rights management, reinforced by exclusive contracts, constitutes an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU and anti-competitive agreements under Article 101 TFEU.

Findings of infringement provide a factual basis. The CNMC’s November 2019 decision in case S/DC/0617/17 fined Mediaset €38.9 million and Atresmedia €38.2 million for anti-competitive advertising practices, including minimum investment quotas, extraprimas incentives, and bundled sales via pauta única, foreclosing competitors. The CNMC mandated practice changes within three months, but Cocoo’s 2023-2025 complaints allege ongoing violations. In April 2022, Mediaset was fined €674,358 for two infractions on Telecinco: €373,002 for inappropriate content during protected hours in Sálvame Naranja on April 15, 2021, and €301,356 (reduced to €180,813.60 after early payment) for covert advertising. Mediaset’s breaches of Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments were sanctioned in 2013 (€15.6 million) and 2015 (€3 million), though the latter was annulled in December 2024 by the Audiencia Nacional due to CNMC’s procedural errors, not disputing the violation. The EU General Court in 2010 and Court of Justice in 2014 upheld the 2007 ruling in case T-177/07 that Italy’s €110 million digital decoder subsidies were illegal state aid, benefiting Mediaset, with approximately €5 million recovered. The European Commission’s May 2025 preliminary closure of Cocoo’s complaint, citing CNMC’s discretion, is being challenged for overlooking cross-border effects and AVMSD/EMFA non-compliance.

The search link https://www.opensanctions.org/advancedsearch/ was used to check for sanctions against Mediaset, Atresmedia, or related entities like Fininvest or Berlusconi. No sanctions were found, suggesting their practices, while anti-competitive, have not triggered international sanctions lists. This limits direct applicability but reinforces that the case hinges on competition and regulatory law, not sanctions violations. The link https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/ was searched for SGAE UK Limited, confirming its registration (Company No. 06647724) but no direct evidence of anti-competitive practices, aligning with Cocoo’s allegations of potential replication of SGAE’s Spanish conduct. The link https://opencorporates.com/companies provided ownership details, confirming Mediaset España’s control by MFE-MediaForEurope (Italy) and Fininvest’s stake, highlighting Berlusconi’s influence, which strengthens public interest arguments about media concentration. Other links, such as https://www.sede.registradores.org/, https://globaltradealert.org/data-center, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/industries, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/legacy/companysearch.html, and https://www.globalspec.com/search/products?categoryIds=5346, yielded no direct results relevant to Mediaset or the case, focusing on unrelated sectors or requiring inaccessible real-time searches.

Key insights include the economic rationale from the strict liability paper, explaining the duopoly’s behavior as a predictable outcome of scarce inputs, incentivizing reduced compliance. The CNMC’s procedural errors and dismissal of new evidence highlight systemic regulatory failures. Cross-border impacts on UK operators expand jurisdictional options. The public interest angle, particularly media plurality, amplifies campaign resonance. Evidentiary needs include advertiser spend data, internal communications, and WPI analysis. Jurisdictional tactics involve Spanish judicial review, EU complaints, and UK CMA engagement.

To monetize the case, Cocoo can pursue collective action damages, estimating tens of millions based on the 2019 CNMC fine, with a 20-30% contingency fee. A multi-platform campaign using free tools like LinkedIn and Google operators can recruit claimants. A pilot mediation at €50,000-€100,000, with costs split, could lead to a €500,000+ contract. Unsolicited proposals to UK, EU, and Spanish procurement portals for consultancy services could yield €100,000-€500,000 contracts. Donations and sponsorships from industry associations can fund operations, while third-party litigation funding and pro bono partnerships reduce costs.

In conclusion, Cocoo’s case is robust, supported by documented infringements and economic theory. Legal actions, a targeted campaign, and mediation can secure significant compensation and revenue. Immediate steps include collecting advertiser data, filing a judicial review, and proposing a pilot mediation.

COAS & FOIS

All possible causes of action against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC are grounded in competition law, tortious liability, contract law, and public interest violations, drawing from the WordPress content and prior research. First, under EU and Spanish competition law, specifically Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 2 of the Spanish Law on Defence of Competition, Mediaset and Atresmedia are accused of abusing their collective dominant position in the television advertising market, where they control over 85% of the market share. Their alleged practices include forcing advertisers to buy bundled advertising packages, linking premium channels like Telecinco and Antena 3 with less desirable ones like Cuatro or La Sexta, which violates merger commitments such as the 22% audience cap for Telecinco/Cuatro advertising packages. They also impose minimum investment quotas, requiring advertisers to allocate over 70% of their budgets to their channels, foreclosing smaller competitors like KISS Media or digital platforms. Additionally, their exclusive content acquisition contracts, often exceeding three to five years for premium content like La Liga or major films, restrict competitors’ access to attractive programming. Price discrimination, offering up to 40% discounts to large advertisers while charging SMEs standard rates, further distorts competition. Allegations of technological obstruction, such as delaying UHD Digital Terrestrial Television deployment, and Mediaset’s failure to meet the mandatory 5% investment in European audiovisual works also constitute abusive practices.

Under Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC, the parallel conduct of Mediaset and Atresmedia in pricing, bundling, and market strategies suggests tacit collusion, particularly in a transparent market with rigid supply due to limited DTT spectrum and TVE’s exit from advertising. Their “pauta única” simulcast advertising system, broadcasting ads across multiple channels simultaneously, reinforces this coordination. These practices may also violate Article 3 LDC as unfair competition, especially when bundling advertising with SGAE musical rights contracts or imposing permanence clauses that exploit market power. A distinct cause of action arises from Mediaset’s repeated breaches of Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments, which prohibited tied sales and set audience caps, and Atresmedia’s similar practices post-Antena 3/La Sexta merger, indicating systemic non-compliance.

In tort law, the Wrongful Profit Impairment framework, supported by the academic paper on strict liability in duopolies with scarce inputs, establishes liability for economic and public harms. Mediaset and Atresmedia’s practices, driven by scarce inputs like DTT spectrum and premium content, reduce “care” in terms of regulatory compliance and media plurality, causing economic harm to competitors like smaller broadcasters and digital platforms through lost revenue and market access. Advertisers, particularly SMEs and agencies like Publicis or WPP, face inflated costs and reduced marketing efficiency due to bundling and quotas. The broader public suffers from reduced media plurality and potential information manipulation, undermining democratic discourse and violating rights under Article 11 of the EU Charter and Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution. These actions constitute tortious interference with economic relations and public nuisance due to their impact on market fairness and information diversity.

Contractually, advertising contracts imposing bundled sales or minimum quotas are void under Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC for restricting competition. Advertisers, coerced into these terms due to the duopoly’s dominance, can claim economic duress, rendering contracts voidable. Merger commitments, though quasi-contractual, are legally binding, and their violation supports claims for damages by affected parties. Consumer protection violations arise from hidden advertising in programs like Sálvame Naranja and broadcasting inappropriate content during protected hours, breaching transparency and consumer rights under Spanish law. Investors face harm from a distorted, non-transparent market, potentially violating Article 7 of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

Against the CNMC, regulatory negligence under Spanish administrative law and the Francovich doctrine for EU law breaches is actionable due to its failure to enforce merger commitments and investigate new evidence, enabling ongoing market harm. The CNMC’s claim that the vigilance period has ended is challengeable via judicial review under Ley 29/1998, as its inaction violates its duty to ensure competition. Public authorities, such as the Ministry of Economy or Culture, face liability for illegal state aid under Article 107 TFEU, particularly the alleged €8.2 million non-competitive allocation of NextGenerationEU funds to Mediaset’s subsidiary Gestmusic Endemol, and for breaching EU public procurement rules. Failure to enforce the Audiovisual Media Services Directive and European Media Freedom Act, allowing media concentration, supports claims of regulatory failure, potentially ultra vires.

SGAE’s near-100% control over musical rights management, reinforced by exclusive contracts with Mediaset and Atresmedia, constitutes an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU and anti-competitive agreements under Article 101 TFEU, potentially voiding related contracts.

Findings of infringement provide a strong factual basis. The CNMC’s November 2019 decision in case S/DC/0617/17 fined Mediaset €38.9 million and Atresmedia €38.2 million for anti-competitive advertising practices, including minimum investment quotas, extraprimas incentives, and bundled sales via pauta única, which foreclosed competitors. The CNMC mandated practice modifications within three months, but Cocoo’s 2023-2025 complaints allege ongoing violations, suggesting non-compliance. In April 2022, Mediaset was fined €674,358 for two infractions on Telecinco: €373,002 for broadcasting inappropriate content during protected hours in Sálvame Naranja on April 15, 2021, and €301,356 (reduced to €180,813.60 after early payment) for covert advertising in Sálvame Naranja and Sálvame Deluxe. Mediaset’s breaches of Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments were sanctioned in 2013 (€15.6 million) and 2015 (€3 million), though the latter was annulled in December 2024 by the Audiencia Nacional due to CNMC’s procedural errors in handling confidential advertiser data, not disputing the underlying violation. The EU General Court in 2010 and Court of Justice in 2014 upheld the European Commission’s 2007 ruling in case T-177/07 that Italy’s €110 million digital decoder subsidies were illegal state aid, benefiting Mediaset, with approximately €5 million recovered. The European Commission’s May 2025 preliminary closure of Cocoo’s complaint, citing CNMC’s discretion, is being challenged for overlooking cross-border effects and AVMSD/EMFA non-compliance.

Key insights include the economic rationale from the strict liability paper, which explains the duopoly’s behavior as a predictable outcome of scarce inputs like DTT spectrum and premium content, incentivizing reduced compliance and market distortion. The CNMC’s procedural errors and dismissal of new evidence highlight systemic regulatory failures, strengthening negligence claims. Cross-border impacts on UK operators and EU market integration expand jurisdictional options. The public interest angle, particularly media plurality and alleged information manipulation, amplifies campaign resonance and mediation leverage. Evidentiary needs include granular advertising spend data, internal communications from Mediaset/Atresmedia, and expert WPI analysis to counter CNMC’s “insufficient evidence” stance. Jurisdictional tactics involve filing a judicial review in Spain’s Audiencia Nacional, escalating to the European Commission under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, and engaging the UK CMA for cross-border harms, with parallel proceedings to maximize pressure.

To monetize the case, Cocoo can pursue collective action damages, estimating losses in the tens of millions based on the 2019 CNMC fine, with Cocoo taking a 20-30% contingency fee. A multi-platform campaign on LinkedIn, X, and Meta targeting SMEs, media agencies, and broadcasters can recruit claimants cost-effectively using free tools like Google search operators. A pilot mediation, proposed at €50,000-€100,000 with costs split among parties, could lead to a broader €500,000+ mediation contract, positioning Cocoo as a paid facilitator. Unsolicited proposals to UK (RM6098 framework), EU (TED tenders), and Spanish procurement portals for consultancy services in competition policy or media regulation could yield €100,000-€500,000 contracts, leveraging Cocoo’s WPI expertise. Donations via the campaign website, targeting €50,000-€100,000, and sponsorships from industry associations like AEA (€10,000-€50,000) can fund operations. Third-party litigation funding, offering 30-40% of damages, and pro bono legal partnerships can reduce costs while scaling efforts.

In conclusion, Cocoo’s case is robust, supported by documented infringements and economic theory. By pursuing legal actions, a targeted campaign, and mediation, Cocoo can secure significant compensation and revenue while advancing market fairness. Immediate steps include collecting advertiser data, filing a judicial review, and proposing a pilot mediation.

[](https://x.com/elmundoes/status/1194600049059209217)[](https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/mergers/practical-information/cases-search-user-guide_en)[](https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/cases-search-user-guide_en)

In tort law, the Wrongful Profit Impairment framework, supported by the academic paper on strict liability in duopolies with scarce inputs, establishes liability for economic and public harms. Mediaset and Atresmedia’s practices, driven by scarce inputs like DTT spectrum and premium content, reduce “care” in terms of regulatory compliance and media plurality, causing economic harm to competitors like smaller broadcasters and digital platforms through lost revenue and market access. Advertisers, particularly SMEs and agencies like Publicis or WPP, face inflated costs and reduced marketing efficiency due to bundling and quotas. The broader public suffers from reduced media plurality and potential information manipulation, undermining democratic discourse and violating rights under Article 11 of the EU Charter and Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution. These actions constitute tortious interference with economic relations and public nuisance due to their impact on market fairness and information diversity.

Contractually, advertising contracts imposing bundled sales or minimum quotas are void under Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC for restricting competition. Advertisers, coerced into these terms due to the duopoly’s dominance, can claim economic duress, rendering contracts voidable. Merger commitments, though quasi-contractual, are legally binding, and their violation supports claims for damages by affected parties. Consumer protection violations arise from hidden advertising in programs like Sálvame Naranja and broadcasting inappropriate content during protected hours, breaching transparency and consumer rights under Spanish law. Investors face harm from a distorted, non-transparent market, potentially violating Article 7 of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.

Legal Strategy Report for Cocoo v. Mediaset/Atresmedia

1. All Possible Causes of Action

Based on the provided WordPress content and prior research, the following causes of action are viable against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC, categorized by legal framework and defendant.

Against Mediaset and Atresmedia

Competition Law Violations

Abuse of Dominant Position (Article 102 TFEU, Article 2 LDC): Mediaset and Atresmedia, with a combined market share exceeding 85% in the Spanish TV advertising market, are alleged to hold a collective dominant position. Their practices include:

Forced Bundling and Tied Sales: Requiring advertisers to purchase advertising slots on less desirable channels (e.g., Cuatro, FDF for Mediaset; La Sexta for Atresmedia) to access premium channels (e.g., Telecinco, Antena 3), violating merger commitments (e.g., 22% audience cap for Telecinco/Cuatro).
Minimum Investment Quotas: Imposing high minimum investment shares (e.g., over 70% of an advertiser’s budget), foreclosing competitors like smaller broadcasters or digital platforms.
Exclusive Content Acquisition: Securing long-term exclusive contracts (exceeding 3-5 years) for premium content (e.g., La Liga, major films), limiting competitors’ access to attractive programming.
Price Discrimination: Offering substantial discounts (up to 40%) to large advertisers while charging SMEs standard rates, distorting competition.
Technological Obstruction: Allegedly delaying UHD DTT deployment to disadvantage competitors.
Failure to Invest in European Works: Mediaset’s alleged shortfall in the mandatory 5% investment in European audiovisual works, undermining cultural diversity.

Anti-Competitive Agreements (Article 101 TFEU, Article 1 LDC): Parallel conduct in pricing, bundling, and market strategies suggests tacit collusion, particularly in a transparent market with rigid supply (due to DTT spectrum limits and TVE’s exit from advertising). Practices like “pauta única” (simulcast advertising) and synchronized pricing reinforce this claim.

Unfair Competition (Article 3 LDC): Bundling advertising with SGAE musical rights contracts or imposing permanence clauses constitutes unfair competition, exploiting market power to distort market access.

Breach of Merger Commitments: Mediaset’s repeated violations of Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments (e.g., no tied sales, 22% audience cap) and Atresmedia’s similar practices post-Antena 3/La Sexta merger indicate ongoing non-compliance, triggering liability for market harm.

Tortious Liability

Wrongful Profit Impairment (WPI): The academic framework from “Strict Liability, Scarce Generic Input and Duopoly Competition” supports claims that the duopoly’s practices, driven by scarce inputs (DTT spectrum, premium content, advertising slots), reduce “care” (compliance, media plurality), causing:

Economic Harm to Competitors: Smaller broadcasters (e.g., KISS Media, Vocento) and digital platforms lose revenue due to restricted access to advertising and content.
Economic Harm to Advertisers: SMEs and media agencies (e.g., Publicis, WPP) face inflated costs and reduced marketing efficiency due to bundling and quotas.
Public Harm: Reduced media plurality and potential information manipulation harm consumers’ right to diverse information (Article 11 EU Charter, Article 20 Spanish Constitution).

Tortious Interference with Economic Relations: The duopoly’s exclusionary practices intentionally limit competitors’ and advertisers’ market opportunities, constituting an economic tort under Spanish and EU law.

Public Nuisance: The concentration of media control (over 70% of prime-time news) and alleged dissemination of biased content undermine democratic discourse, constituting a collective tort.

Contract Law Violations

Invalid Advertising Contracts: Contracts imposing bundled sales or minimum quotas are void under Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC for restricting competition. Additionally, economic duress claims arise as advertisers, lacking viable alternatives due to the duopoly’s dominance, were coerced into unfavorable terms.

Breach of Quasi-Contractual Commitments: Merger commitments are legally binding. Their violation by Mediaset (and potentially Atresmedia) allows affected parties to seek damages for losses caused by non-compliance.

Consumer and Investor Violations

Consumer Protection Violations: Hidden advertising (e.g., in “Sálvame Naranja”) and broadcasting inappropriate content during protected hours violate transparency and consumer protection laws (e.g., Spanish General Law for the Defence of Consumers and Users).
Investor Harm: The duopoly’s practices deter foreign investment by creating a non-transparent market, violating principles of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (Article 7).

Against the CNMC

Regulatory Negligence: The CNMC’s failure to enforce merger commitments and investigate new evidence of anti-competitive practices constitutes a breach of its statutory duty under Article 2 LDC and EU competition law. This negligence enabled ongoing market harm, supporting a tort claim under Spanish administrative law (Ley 40/2015) or the Francovich doctrine for EU law breaches.

Omission of Duty: The CNMC’s refusal to reopen the Telecinco/Cuatro expediente despite new evidence (e.g., continued bundling) and its claim that “vigilance has ended” violate its obligation to ensure effective competition, actionable via judicial review (Ley 29/1998).

State Liability for EU Law Breaches: Failure to transpose or enforce the AVMSD and EMFA, allowing media concentration and reduced plurality, triggers state liability for damages under the Francovich doctrine.

Against Public Authorities (e.g., Ministry of Economy, Culture)

Illegal State Aid (Article 107 TFEU): Alleged non-competitive allocation of €8.2 million in NextGenerationEU funds to Mediaset’s subsidiary (Gestmusic Endemol) constitutes illegal state aid, rendering contracts void and recoverable.
Breach of Public Procurement Rules: Non-competitive tender processes violate EU Directive 2014/24/EU and Spanish procurement law (Ley de Contratos del Sector Público), allowing challenges to contract validity.
Failure to Ensure Media Plurality: Inadequate enforcement of AVMSD/EMFA obligations to promote media diversity supports claims of regulatory failure, potentially ultra vires under Spanish administrative law.

Against SGAE

Abuse of Dominant Position: SGAE’s near-100% control over musical rights management, reinforced by exclusive contracts with Mediaset/Atresmedia, restricts access for competitors, violating Article 102 TFEU.
Anti-Competitive Agreements: Exclusive rights contracts that bundle music licensing with advertising deals violate Article 101 TFEU, potentially rendering them void.

2. Findings of Infringement

The following documented infringements by Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC provide a factual basis for the causes of action.

CNMC Findings

Anti-Competitive Advertising Practices (S/DC/0617/17, November 2019): The CNMC fined Mediaset €38.9 million and Atresmedia €38.2 million for anti-competitive practices in the TV advertising market. Violations included:

Imposing minimum investment quotas (e.g., 70% of advertiser budgets).
Offering “extraprimas” incentives to media agencies for high investment volumes.
Bundling advertising across channels via “pauta única” simulcast, foreclosing smaller competitors.
The CNMC ordered both to modify practices within three months, but ongoing allegations suggest non-compliance.

Inappropriate Content and Covert Advertising (April 2022): Mediaset was fined €674,358 for two infractions on Telecinco:

€373,002 for broadcasting content harmful to minors during protected hours in “Sálvame Naranja” (April 15, 2021).
€301,356 (reduced to €180,813.60 after early payment) for covert advertising of “Los sabores de la Esteban, S.L.” products in “Sálvame Naranja” (April 23, 2021) and “Sálvame Deluxe” (May 1, 2021).

Breach of Merger Commitments (Telecinco/Cuatro, C/0230/10):

2013 Sanction: Mediaset was fined €15.6 million for linking Telecinco and Cuatro advertising sales, violating merger commitments.
2015 Sanction: A €3 million fine was imposed for similar breaches, including global investment quota discounts. This was annulled in 2024 by the Audiencia Nacional due to procedural errors (confidential advertiser data), but the underlying violation was not disputed.
Cocoo’s 2023-2025 complaints allege continued breaches (e.g., bundling, quotas), supported by new evidence, though the CNMC dismissed these, claiming the vigilance period ended.

Court Findings

Audiencia Nacional (December 2024): Annulled the 2015 €3 million CNMC fine due to procedural errors (failure to disclose advertiser identities), highlighting CNMC’s investigative shortcomings but not negating Mediaset’s underlying breaches.

EU Courts (T-177/07, 2010; C-69/13, 2014): The General Court and Court of Justice upheld the European Commission’s 2007 ruling that Italy’s €110 million digital decoder subsidies constituted illegal state aid, benefiting Mediaset and RAI. Italy was ordered to recover approximately €5 million from Mediaset, reinforcing its history of benefiting from market distortions.

European Commission

Preliminary Closure (May 2025): The EC dismissed Cocoo’s complaint, citing CNMC’s discretion and prior sanctions, finding no EU law breach. Cocoo’s response highlighted cross-border effects and EMFA/AVMSD non-compliance, but no final EC ruling is noted.

3. Insights

Legal and Strategic Insights

Duopoly Dynamics: The “Strict Liability, Scarce Generic Input and Duopoly Competition” paper provides a compelling economic rationale for the duopoly’s behavior. Scarce inputs (DTT spectrum, premium content) incentivize Mediaset and Atresmedia to prioritize output (advertising revenue, channel expansion) over “care” (regulatory compliance, media plurality), leading to predictable anti-competitive practices. This supports strict liability claims, as harm is a structural outcome, not merely intentional.
Regulatory Failure: The CNMC’s repeated dismissals and procedural errors (e.g., 2024 annulment) highlight systemic oversight failures, strengthening claims of negligence and state liability. The “vigilance has ended” stance contradicts the need for continuous ex-ante regulation in duopolistic markets.
Cross-Border Implications: Alleged harms to UK operators (e.g., BBC, ITV) and violations of the EU-UK Trade Agreement (Article 7) expand the case’s scope, enabling multi-jurisdictional strategies.
Public Interest Leverage: Allegations of media manipulation and reduced plurality resonate with public concerns, amplifying Cocoo’s campaign and mediation leverage.

Evidentiary Needs

Advertising Data: Granular data from advertisers (e.g., spend records, bundling terms) is critical to quantify WPI and prove economic harm.
Internal Communications: Subpoenaed emails or strategy documents from Mediaset/Atresmedia could reveal intent behind anti-competitive practices.
Expert Testimony: Economic experts using WPI methodology and market definition (SSNIP test) can counter CNMC’s “insufficient evidence” claim.

Jurisdictional Tactics

Spain: File a judicial review in the Audiencia Nacional against CNMC’s inaction, leveraging Ley 29/1998’s broad standing for collective interests.
EU: Escalate to the European Commission under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation or Article 102 TFEU, citing cross-border effects.
UK: Engage the CMA or TRA for UK-specific harms, particularly for affected broadcasters.
Parallel Proceedings: Simultaneous actions in Spanish courts and EU institutions increase pressure on all parties.

4. Monetization Strategies

As Cocoo’s solicitor, monetizing the case involves securing financial outcomes for claimants and funding Cocoo’s operations while advancing the case. Strategies include:

Collective Action Compensation

Damages for Claimants: Pursue damages for advertisers, smaller broadcasters, and content producers harmed by inflated advertising costs, lost revenue, or market exclusion. Using WPI methodology, estimate losses (e.g., “competition premium” from bundling) in the tens of millions, leveraging the €77.1 million CNMC fine as a benchmark. A successful collective action in Spanish civil courts or through mediation could yield substantial settlements, with Cocoo taking a percentage (e.g., 20-30%) as a contingency fee to fund operations.
Class Recruitment: Expand the claimant pool via targeted campaigns on LinkedIn, X, and Meta, focusing on SMEs, media agencies (e.g., Publicis, WPP), and broadcasters (e.g., KISS Media). Use free tools like LinkedIn’s basic search and Google operators to contact potential claimants, ensuring cost-effective outreach.

Mediation Revenue

Pilot Mediation: Propose a fixed-fee (€50,000-€100,000) pilot mediation to Mediaset, Atresmedia, advertisers, and the CNMC, focusing on quantifying bundling harms. Split costs among parties to minimize Cocoo’s financial burden. Success could lead to a broader mediation contract (€500,000+), positioning Cocoo as a paid neutral facilitator.
Settlement Structuring: Negotiate settlements including financial compensation and structural remedies (e.g., unbundled advertising, content access rules). Cocoo could secure a mediation fee (5-10% of settlement value) for overseeing implementation and compliance monitoring.

Public Procurement Opportunities

Unsolicited Proposals: Submit proposals to UK (RM6098 framework), EU (TED tenders), and Spanish (Plataforma de Contratación) public bodies for consultancy services in competition policy, digital transformation, or media regulation. Leverage Cocoo’s WPI expertise and case knowledge to secure contracts (e.g., €100,000-€500,000 for market studies or compliance audits). Monitor Contracts Finder and TED using keywords like “media regulation” or CPV codes (e.g., 79410000).
Framework Inclusion: Apply to join frameworks like RM6098 or DPS for consultancy services, subcontracting to established suppliers if needed. This provides steady revenue streams for ongoing case support.

Media Campaign Funding

Donations and Crowdfunding: Amplify the “Rebalancing the Scales” campaign to solicit donations via Cocoo’s website, targeting €50,000-€100,000 to fund legal and campaign costs. Use Meta ads and X hashtags (#FairCompetition) to reach small businesses and consumers.
Sponsorships: Partner with industry associations (e.g., AEA, UTECA) or ethical brands for campaign sponsorship, offering visibility in exchange for funding (€10,000-€50,000).

Strategic Litigation Funding

Third-Party Litigation Funding: Engage funders to cover legal costs in exchange for a share of damages (e.g., 30-40%). Highlight the case’s strong evidence (CNMC fines, court rulings) to attract investors.
Pro Bono Partnerships: Collaborate with law firms specializing in competition law for pro bono or reduced-fee support, reducing Cocoo’s costs while building capacity.

Conclusion

Cocoo’s case against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC is robust, grounded in competition law violations, tortious harms, and regulatory failures. Documented infringements (e.g., 2019 CNMC fine, 2022 content violations) and economic theory (WPI, duopoly dynamics) strengthen our position. By pursuing parallel legal actions, leveraging a multi-platform media campaign, and positioning Cocoo as a mediator, we can secure significant compensation for claimants and revenue for Cocoo through fees, contracts, and donations. Immediate next steps include gathering advertiser data, filing a judicial review in Spain, and proposing a pilot mediation to all parties.

# Legal Strategy Report for Cocoo v. Mediaset/Atresmedia

This report outlines the legal strategy for Cocoo’s collective action against Mediaset España, Atresmedia, and potentially the CNMC, focusing on anti-competitive practices, breaches of merger commitments, and regulatory failures in the Spanish audiovisual market. It addresses all possible causes of action, documented infringements, key insights, and monetization strategies to secure a favorable outcome for Cocoo and its claimants.

## 1. All Possible Causes of Action

Based on the provided WordPress content and prior research, the following causes of action are viable against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC, categorized by legal framework and defendant.

### Against Mediaset and Atresmedia

#### Competition Law Violations
**Abuse of Dominant Position (Article 102 TFEU, Article 2 LDC)**: Mediaset and Atresmedia, with a combined market share exceeding 85% in the Spanish TV advertising market, are alleged to hold a collective dominant position. Their practices include:
– **Forced Bundling and Tied Sales**: Requiring advertisers to purchase advertising slots on less desirable channels (e.g., Cuatro, FDF for Mediaset; La Sexta for Atresmedia) to access premium channels (e.g., Telecinco, Antena 3), violating merger commitments (e.g., 22% audience cap for Telecinco/Cuatro).
– **Minimum Investment Quotas**: Imposing high minimum investment shares (e.g., over 70% of an advertiser’s budget), foreclosing competitors like smaller broadcasters or digital platforms.
– **Exclusive Content Acquisition**: Securing long-term exclusive contracts (exceeding 3-5 years) for premium content (e.g., La Liga, major films), limiting competitors’ access to attractive programming.
– **Price Discrimination**: Offering substantial discounts (up to 40%) to large advertisers while charging SMEs standard rates, distorting competition.
– **Technological Obstruction**: Allegedly delaying UHD DTT deployment to disadvantage competitors.
– **Failure to Invest in European Works**: Mediaset’s alleged shortfall in the mandatory 5% investment in European audiovisual works, undermining cultural diversity.

**Anti-Competitive Agreements (Article 101 TFEU, Article 1 LDC)**: Parallel conduct in pricing, bundling, and market strategies suggests tacit collusion, particularly in a transparent market with rigid supply (due to DTT spectrum limits and TVE’s exit from advertising). Practices like “pauta única” (simulcast advertising) and synchronized pricing reinforce this claim.

**Unfair Competition (Article 3 LDC)**: Bundling advertising with SGAE musical rights contracts or imposing permanence clauses constitutes unfair competition, exploiting market power to distort market access.

**Breach of Merger Commitments**: Mediaset’s repeated violations of Telecinco/Cuatro merger commitments (e.g., no tied sales, 22% audience cap) and Atresmedia’s similar practices post-Antena 3/La Sexta merger indicate ongoing non-compliance, triggering liability for market harm.

#### Tortious Liability
**Wrongful Profit Impairment (WPI)**: The academic framework from “Strict Liability, Scarce Generic Input and Duopoly Competition” supports claims that the duopoly’s practices, driven by scarce inputs (DTT spectrum, premium content, advertising slots), reduce “care” (compliance, media plurality), causing:
– **Economic Harm to Competitors**: Smaller broadcasters (e.g., KISS Media, Vocento) and digital platforms lose revenue due to restricted access to advertising and content.
– **Economic Harm to Advertisers**: SMEs and media agencies (e.g., Publicis, WPP) face inflated costs and reduced marketing efficiency due to bundling and quotas.
– **Public Harm**: Reduced media plurality and potential information manipulation harm consumers’ right to diverse information (Article 11 EU Charter, Article 20 Spanish Constitution).

**Tortious Interference with Economic Relations**: The duopoly’s exclusionary practices intentionally limit competitors’ and advertisers’ market opportunities, constituting an economic tort under Spanish and EU law.

**Public Nuisance**: The concentration of media control (over 70% of prime-time news) and alleged dissemination of biased content undermine democratic discourse, constituting a collective tort.

#### Contract Law Violations
**Invalid Advertising Contracts**: Contracts imposing bundled sales or minimum quotas are void under Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC for restricting competition. Additionally, economic duress claims arise as advertisers, lacking viable alternatives due to the duopoly’s dominance, were coerced into unfavorable terms.

**Breach of Quasi-Contractual Commitments**: Merger commitments are legally binding. Their violation by Mediaset (and potentially Atresmedia) allows affected parties to seek damages for losses caused by non-compliance.

#### Consumer and Investor Violations
**Consumer Protection Violations**: Hidden advertising (e.g., in “Sálvame Naranja”) and broadcasting inappropriate content during protected hours violate transparency and consumer protection laws (e.g., Spanish General Law for the Defence of Consumers and Users).
**Investor Harm**: The duopoly’s practices deter foreign investment by creating a non-transparent market, violating principles of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (Article 7).

### Against the CNMC
**Regulatory Negligence**: The CNMC’s failure to enforce merger commitments and investigate new evidence of anti-competitive practices constitutes a breach of its statutory duty under Article 2 LDC and EU competition law. This negligence enabled ongoing market harm, supporting a tort claim under Spanish administrative law (Ley 40/2015) or the Francovich doctrine for EU law breaches.

**Omission of Duty**: The CNMC’s refusal to reopen the Telecinco/Cuatro expediente despite new evidence (e.g., continued bundling) and its claim that “vigilance has ended” violate its obligation to ensure effective competition, actionable via judicial review (Ley 29/1998).

**State Liability for EU Law Breaches**: Failure to transpose or enforce the AVMSD and EMFA, allowing media concentration and reduced plurality, triggers state liability for damages under the Francovich doctrine.

### Against Public Authorities (e.g., Ministry of Economy, Culture)
**Illegal State Aid (Article 107 TFEU)**: Alleged non-competitive allocation of €8.2 million in NextGenerationEU funds to Mediaset’s subsidiary (Gestmusic Endemol) constitutes illegal state aid, rendering contracts void and recoverable.
**Breach of Public Procurement Rules**: Non-competitive tender processes violate EU Directive 2014/24/EU and Spanish procurement law (Ley de Contratos del Sector Público), allowing challenges to contract validity.
**Failure to Ensure Media Plurality**: Inadequate enforcement of AVMSD/EMFA obligations to promote media diversity supports claims of regulatory failure, potentially ultra vires under Spanish administrative law.

### Against SGAE
**Abuse of Dominant Position**: SGAE’s near-100% control over musical rights management, reinforced by exclusive contracts with Mediaset/Atresmedia, restricts access for competitors, violating Article 102 TFEU.
**Anti-Competitive Agreements**: Exclusive rights contracts that bundle music licensing with advertising deals violate Article 101 TFEU, potentially rendering them void.

## 2. Findings of Infringement

The following documented infringements by Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC provide a factual basis for the causes of action.

### CNMC Findings
**Anti-Competitive Advertising Practices (S/DC/0617/17, November 2019)**: The CNMC fined Mediaset €38.9 million and Atresmedia €38.2 million for anti-competitive practices in the TV advertising market. Violations included:
– Imposing minimum investment quotas (e.g., 70% of advertiser budgets).
– Offering “extraprimas” incentives to media agencies for high investment volumes.
– Bundling advertising across channels via “pauta única” simulcast, foreclosing smaller competitors.
The CNMC ordered both to modify practices within three months, but ongoing allegations suggest non-compliance.

**Inappropriate Content and Covert Advertising (April 2022)**: Mediaset was fined €674,358 for two infractions on Telecinco:
– €373,002 for broadcasting content harmful to minors during protected hours in “Sálvame Naranja” (April 15, 2021).
– €301,356 (reduced to €180,813.60 after early payment) for covert advertising of “Los sabores de la Esteban, S.L.” products in “Sálvame Naranja” (April 23, 2021) and “Sálvame Deluxe” (May 1, 2021).

**Breach of Merger Commitments (Telecinco/Cuatro, C/0230/10)**:
– **2013 Sanction**: Mediaset was fined €15.6 million for linking Telecinco and Cuatro advertising sales, violating merger commitments.
– **2015 Sanction**: A €3 million fine was imposed for similar breaches, including global investment quota discounts. This was annulled in 2024 by the Audiencia Nacional due to procedural errors (confidential advertiser data), but the underlying violation was not disputed.
– Cocoo’s 2023-2025 complaints allege continued breaches (e.g., bundling, quotas), supported by new evidence, though the CNMC dismissed these, claiming the vigilance period ended.

### Court Findings
**Audiencia Nacional (December 2024)**: Annulled the 2015 €3 million CNMC fine due to procedural errors (failure to disclose advertiser identities), highlighting CNMC’s investigative shortcomings but not negating Mediaset’s underlying breaches.

**EU Courts (T-177/07, 2010; C-69/13, 2014)**: The General Court and Court of Justice upheld the European Commission’s 2007 ruling that Italy’s €110 million digital decoder subsidies constituted illegal state aid, benefiting Mediaset and RAI. Italy was ordered to recover approximately €5 million from Mediaset, reinforcing its history of benefiting from market distortions.

### European Commission
**Preliminary Closure (May 2025)**: The EC dismissed Cocoo’s complaint, citing CNMC’s discretion and prior sanctions, finding no EU law breach. Cocoo’s response highlighted cross-border effects and EMFA/AVMSD non-compliance, but no final EC ruling is noted.

## 3. Insights

### Legal and Strategic Insights
– **Duopoly Dynamics**: The “Strict Liability, Scarce Generic Input and Duopoly Competition” paper provides a compelling economic rationale for the duopoly’s behavior. Scarce inputs (DTT spectrum, premium content) incentivize Mediaset and Atresmedia to prioritize output (advertising revenue, channel expansion) over “care” (regulatory compliance, media plurality), leading to predictable anti-competitive practices. This supports strict liability claims, as harm is a structural outcome, not merely intentional.
– **Regulatory Failure**: The CNMC’s repeated dismissals and procedural errors (e.g., 2024 annulment) highlight systemic oversight failures, strengthening claims of negligence and state liability. The “vigilance has ended” stance contradicts the need for continuous ex-ante regulation in duopolistic markets.
– **Cross-Border Implications**: Alleged harms to UK operators (e.g., BBC, ITV) and violations of the EU-UK Trade Agreement (Article 7) expand the case’s scope, enabling multi-jurisdictional strategies.
– **Public Interest Leverage**: Allegations of media manipulation and reduced plurality resonate with public concerns, amplifying Cocoo’s campaign and mediation leverage.

### Evidentiary Needs
– **Advertising Data**: Granular data from advertisers (e.g., spend records, bundling terms) is critical to quantify WPI and prove economic harm.
– **Internal Communications**: Subpoenaed emails or strategy documents from Mediaset/Atresmedia could reveal intent behind anti-competitive practices.
– **Expert Testimony**: Economic experts using WPI methodology and market definition (SSNIP test) can counter CNMC’s “insufficient evidence” claim.

### Jurisdictional Tactics
– **Spain**: File a judicial review in the Audiencia Nacional against CNMC’s inaction, leveraging Ley 29/1998’s broad standing for collective interests.
– **EU**: Escalate to the European Commission under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation or Article 102 TFEU, citing cross-border effects.
– **UK**: Engage the CMA or TRA for UK-specific harms, particularly for affected broadcasters.
– **Parallel Proceedings**: Simultaneous actions in Spanish courts and EU institutions increase pressure on all parties.

## 4. Monetization Strategies

As Cocoo’s solicitor, monetizing the case involves securing financial outcomes for claimants and funding Cocoo’s operations while advancing the case. Strategies include:

### Collective Action Compensation
– **Damages for Claimants**: Pursue damages for advertisers, smaller broadcasters, and content producers harmed by inflated advertising costs, lost revenue, or market exclusion. Using WPI methodology, estimate losses (e.g., “competition premium” from bundling) in the tens of millions, leveraging the €77.1 million CNMC fine as a benchmark. A successful collective action in Spanish civil courts or through mediation could yield substantial settlements, with Cocoo taking a percentage (e.g., 20-30%) as a contingency fee to fund operations.
– **Class Recruitment**: Expand the claimant pool via targeted campaigns on LinkedIn, X, and Meta, focusing on SMEs, media agencies (e.g., Publicis, WPP), and broadcasters (e.g., KISS Media). Use free tools like LinkedIn’s basic search and Google operators to contact potential claimants, ensuring cost-effective outreach.

### Mediation Revenue
– **Pilot Mediation**: Propose a fixed-fee (€50,000-€100,000) pilot mediation to Mediaset, Atresmedia, advertisers, and the CNMC, focusing on quantifying bundling harms. Split costs among parties to minimize Cocoo’s financial burden. Success could lead to a broader mediation contract (€500,000+), positioning Cocoo as a paid neutral facilitator.
– **Settlement Structuring**: Negotiate settlements including financial compensation and structural remedies (e.g., unbundled advertising, content access rules). Cocoo could secure a mediation fee (5-10% of settlement value) for overseeing implementation and compliance monitoring.

### Public Procurement Opportunities
– **Unsolicited Proposals**: Submit proposals to UK (RM6098 framework), EU (TED tenders), and Spanish (Plataforma de Contratación) public bodies for consultancy services in competition policy, digital transformation, or media regulation. Leverage Cocoo’s WPI expertise and case knowledge to secure contracts (e.g., €100,000-€500,000 for market studies or compliance audits). Monitor Contracts Finder and TED using keywords like “media regulation” or CPV codes (e.g., 79410000).
– **Framework Inclusion**: Apply to join frameworks like RM6098 or DPS for consultancy services, subcontracting to established suppliers if needed. This provides steady revenue streams for ongoing case support.

### Media Campaign Funding
– **Donations and Crowdfunding**: Amplify the “Rebalancing the Scales” campaign to solicit donations via Cocoo’s website, targeting €50,000-€100,000 to fund legal and campaign costs. Use Meta ads and X hashtags (#FairCompetition) to reach small businesses and consumers.
– **Sponsorships**: Partner with industry associations (e.g., AEA, UTECA) or ethical brands for campaign sponsorship, offering visibility in exchange for funding (€10,000-€50,000).

### Strategic Litigation Funding
– **Third-Party Litigation Funding**: Engage funders to cover legal costs in exchange for a share of damages (e.g., 30-40%). Highlight the case’s strong evidence (CNMC fines, court rulings) to attract investors.
– **Pro Bono Partnerships**: Collaborate with law firms specializing in competition law for pro bono or reduced-fee support, reducing Cocoo’s costs while building capacity.

## Conclusion
Cocoo’s case against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC is robust, grounded in competition law violations, tortious harms, and regulatory failures. Documented infringements (e.g., 2019 CNMC fine, 2022 content violations) and economic theory (WPI, duopoly dynamics) strengthen our position. By pursuing parallel legal actions, leveraging a multi-platform media campaign, and positioning Cocoo as a mediator, we can secure significant compensation for claimants and revenue for Cocoo through fees, contracts, and donations. Immediate next steps include gathering advertiser data, filing a judicial review in Spain, and proposing a pilot mediation to all parties.

Legal Strategy Report for Cocoo v. Mediaset/Atresmedia

As Cocoo’s solicitor, my mission is to win this case against Mediaset España, Atresmedia, and potentially the CNMC, focusing on their alleged anti-competitive practices, breaches of merger commitments, and regulatory failures in the Spanish television advertising and broadcasting markets. Below, I provide a comprehensive response addressing all requested elements: possible causes of action, findings of infringement, insights, and strategies to monetize the case, leveraging the provided WordPress content and prior research.

# Legal Strategy Report for Cocoo v. Mediaset/Atresmedia

## 1. All Possible Causes of Action

Based on the provided WordPress content and prior research, the following causes of action are viable against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC, categorized by legal framework and defendant.

### Against Mediaset and Atresmedia

**Public Nuisance**: The concentration of media control (over 70% of prime-time news) and alleged dissemination of biased content undermine democratic discourse, constituting a collective tort.

## 2. Findings of Infringement

The following documented infringements by Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC provide a factual basis for the causes of action.

## 3. Insights

## 4. Monetization Strategies

As Cocoo’s solicitor, monetizing the case involves securing financial outcomes for claimants and funding Cocoo’s operations while advancing the case. Strategies include:

1. All Possible Causes of Action

Based on the provided WordPress content and prior research, the following causes of action are viable against Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC, categorized by legal framework and defendant.

Against Mediaset and Atresmedia

Competition Law Violations

Forced Bundling and Tied Sales: Requiring advertisers to purchase advertising slots on less desirable channels (e.g., Cuatro, FDF for Mediaset; La Sexta for Atresmedia) to access premium channels (e.g., Telecinco, Antena 3), violating merger commitments (e.g., 22% audience cap for Telecinco/Cuatro).
Minimum Investment Quotas: Imposing high minimum investment shares (e.g., over 70% of an advertiser’s budget), foreclosing competitors like smaller broadcasters or digital platforms.
Exclusive Content Acquisition: Securing long-term exclusive contracts (exceeding 3-5 years) for premium content (e.g., La Liga, major films), limiting competitors’ access to attractive programming.
Price Discrimination: Offering substantial discounts (up to 40%) to large advertisers while charging SMEs standard rates, distorting competition.
Technological Obstruction: Allegedly delaying UHD DTT deployment to disadvantage competitors.
Failure to Invest in European Works: Mediaset’s alleged shortfall in the mandatory 5% investment in European audiovisual works, undermining cultural diversity.

Tortious Liability

Economic Harm to Competitors: Smaller broadcasters (e.g., KISS Media, Vocento) and digital platforms lose revenue due to restricted access to advertising and content.
Economic Harm to Advertisers: SMEs and media agencies (e.g., Publicis, WPP) face inflated costs and reduced marketing efficiency due to bundling and quotas.
Public Harm: Reduced media plurality and potential information manipulation harm consumers’ right to diverse information (Article 11 EU Charter, Article 20 Spanish Constitution).

Public Nuisance: The concentration of media control (over 70% of prime-time news) and alleged dissemination of biased content undermine democratic discourse, constituting a collective tort.

Contract Law Violations

Consumer and Investor Violations

Against the CNMC

Against Public Authorities (e.g., Ministry of Economy, Culture)

Against SGAE

2. Findings of Infringement

The following documented infringements by Mediaset, Atresmedia, and the CNMC provide a factual basis for the causes of action.

CNMC Findings

Imposing minimum investment quotas (e.g., 70% of advertiser budgets).
Offering “extraprimas” incentives to media agencies for high investment volumes.
Bundling advertising across channels via “pauta única” simulcast, foreclosing smaller competitors.
The CNMC ordered both to modify practices within three months, but ongoing allegations suggest non-compliance.

Inappropriate Content and Covert Advertising (April 2022): Mediaset was fined €674,358 for two infractions on Telecinco:

€373,002 for broadcasting content harmful to minors during protected hours in “Sálvame Naranja” (April 15, 2021).
€301,356 (reduced to €180,813.60 after early payment) for covert advertising of “Los sabores de la Esteban, S.L.” products in “Sálvame Naranja” (April 23, 2021) and “Sálvame Deluxe” (May 1, 2021).

Breach of Merger Commitments (Telecinco/Cuatro, C/0230/10):

2013 Sanction: Mediaset was fined €15.6 million for linking Telecinco and Cuatro advertising sales, violating merger commitments.
2015 Sanction: A €3 million fine was imposed for similar breaches, including global investment quota discounts. This was annulled in 2024 by the Audiencia Nacional due to procedural errors (confidential advertiser data), but the underlying violation was not disputed.
Cocoo’s 2023-2025 complaints allege continued breaches (e.g., bundling, quotas), supported by new evidence, though the CNMC dismissed these, claiming the vigilance period ended.

Court Findings

European Commission

3. Insights

Legal and Strategic Insights

Duopoly Dynamics: The “Strict Liability, Scarce Generic Input and Duopoly Competition” paper provides a compelling economic rationale for the duopoly’s behavior. Scarce inputs (DTT spectrum, premium content) incentivize Mediaset and Atresmedia to prioritize output (advertising revenue, channel expansion) over “care” (regulatory compliance, media plurality), leading to predictable anti-competitive practices. This supports strict liability claims, as harm is a structural outcome, not merely intentional.
Regulatory Failure: The CNMC’s repeated dismissals and procedural errors (e.g., 2024 annulment) highlight systemic oversight failures, strengthening claims of negligence and state liability. The “vigilance has ended” stance contradicts the need for continuous ex-ante regulation in duopolistic markets.
Cross-Border Implications: Alleged harms to UK operators (e.g., BBC, ITV) and violations of the EU-UK Trade Agreement (Article 7) expand the case’s scope, enabling multi-jurisdictional strategies.
Public Interest Leverage: Allegations of media manipulation and reduced plurality resonate with public concerns, amplifying Cocoo’s campaign and mediation leverage.

Evidentiary Needs

Advertising Data: Granular data from advertisers (e.g., spend records, bundling terms) is critical to quantify WPI and prove economic harm.
Internal Communications: Subpoenaed emails or strategy documents from Mediaset/Atresmedia could reveal intent behind anti-competitive practices.
Expert Testimony: Economic experts using WPI methodology and market definition (SSNIP test) can counter CNMC’s “insufficient evidence” claim.

Jurisdictional Tactics

Spain: File a judicial review in the Audiencia Nacional against CNMC’s inaction, leveraging Ley 29/1998’s broad standing for collective interests.
EU: Escalate to the European Commission under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation or Article 102 TFEU, citing cross-border effects.
UK: Engage the CMA or TRA for UK-specific harms, particularly for affected broadcasters.
Parallel Proceedings: Simultaneous actions in Spanish courts and EU institutions increase pressure on all parties.

4. Monetization Strategies

As Cocoo’s solicitor, monetizing the case involves securing financial outcomes for claimants and funding Cocoo’s operations while advancing the case. Strategies include:

Collective Action Compensation

Damages for Claimants: Pursue damages for advertisers, smaller broadcasters, and content producers harmed by inflated advertising costs, lost revenue, or market exclusion. Using WPI methodology, estimate losses (e.g., “competition premium” from bundling) in the tens of millions, leveraging the €77.1 million CNMC fine as a benchmark. A successful collective action in Spanish civil courts or through mediation could yield substantial settlements, with Cocoo taking a percentage (e.g., 20-30%) as a contingency fee to fund operations.
Class Recruitment: Expand the claimant pool via targeted campaigns on LinkedIn, X, and Meta, focusing on SMEs, media agencies (e.g., Publicis, WPP), and broadcasters (e.g., KISS Media). Use free tools like LinkedIn’s basic search and Google operators to contact potential claimants, ensuring cost-effective outreach.

Mediation Revenue

Pilot Mediation: Propose a fixed-fee (€50,000-€100,000) pilot mediation to Mediaset, Atresmedia, advertisers, and the CNMC, focusing on quantifying bundling harms. Split costs among parties to minimize Cocoo’s financial burden. Success could lead to a broader mediation contract (€500,000+), positioning Cocoo as a paid neutral facilitator.
Settlement Structuring: Negotiate settlements including financial compensation and structural remedies (e.g., unbundled advertising, content access rules). Cocoo could secure a mediation fee (5-10% of settlement value) for overseeing implementation and compliance monitoring.

Public Procurement Opportunities

Unsolicited Proposals: Submit proposals to UK (RM6098 framework), EU (TED tenders),